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AIR ATTACK
[CAPT. McGonagle:] After general quarters was over
from the drill, I lingered on the bridge for a few
minutes. As I recall, the following officers were
present on the bridge: LCDR ARMSTRONG, LT ENNIS, LT
O'CONNOR, who is normally officer of the deck during
general quarters, LT TOTH, the Operations and
Navigator, also Intelligence Officer. LTJG PAINTER
came onto the bridge after general quarters to assume
the watch as the officer of the deck. As he assumed
the officer of the deck watch, he indicated that he
was having difficulty in obtaining an accurate ship's
fix. At that time, and the time was approximately
1400. I personally sighted the Minaret at El Arish
to be on a bearing of 142 from the ship and the range
as I recall from the radar was approximately 25.5
miles.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] At this point in the preparation
of my statement, I referred to the quartermaster's
notebook. 12-1600 watch. Thursday, 8 June 1967. I
referred to this log for the purpose of refreshing my
memory as to the initial moments of the unexpected
attack. The log shows that at 1355, LTJG PAINTER
relieved LT O'CONNER as officer of the deck. The log
also shows that at 1355, ENS O'MALLEY, as junior
officer of the deck under instruction assumed the
con. The 12-1600 watch on Thursday, 8 June 1967 has
no entry from the time frame 1356 until 1446. I
shall relate in my own words and to the best of my
knowledge and belief all events of which I have
personal knowledge which occurred during that time
frame.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] The time gap in the
Quartermasters notebook resulted from the fact that
there were insufficient number of people in the
bridge area to maintain an accurate record of events
as they occurred and execute the orders of the
Commanding Officer simultaneously. With
communications to various stations limited various
personnel, as they were noted on the bridge, were
used as messengers. At one time during this time
frame, the only individuals seen on the bridge were
Quartermaster BROWN, who was on the helm, Ensign
LUCAS, and Myself. Ensign LUCAS was busy relaying my
instructions to the various battle stations. The
smooth log will be a reconstruction of events as
recalled by the Commanding Officer, who was present
on the bridge throughout the entire incident and
maintained his faculties at all times during the
incident. [50]
1351 [LOG:] 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR
32,000 YARDS BEARING 082T - REJUHED TO BRIDGE AS 3
SURFACE CONTACT
1353 [LOG:] RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER
SURFACE CONTACTS.
1358 [LOG:] SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM
135 DEG RELATIVE 5 - 6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE
APPROXIMATELY 7000 FT. A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP
1403 [LOG:] LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS
1405 [LOG:] SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN
VICINITY OF FRAME 85, 01 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR
DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.
1405 [LOG:] ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLED BY ENGINE ORDER
TELEGRAPH.
1405 - 1410 [LOG:] SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK
WITH TWO OR MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STAFING,
ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR
FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF SHIP WITH
FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE
KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED
DURING THE AIR A ATTACK, ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY
WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE
KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS
RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED
OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE 01 LEVEL PORT SIDE.
APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING
COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREA FROM
SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS. [129-130]
[CAPT. McGonagle:] About 1400 the lookouts, who were
stationed on the 04 level, immediately above the
bridge, reported that jet aircraft were sighted in
the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to
the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars
and there observed one aircraft of similar
characteristics, if not identical to the two aircraft
which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which
a sighting report had been submitted. The relative
bearing of this plane was about 135. Its position
angle about 45 to 50 degrees. Its elevation
approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately
five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on
a parallel course traveling in the same direction an
the ship. While I observed this aircraft, I did not
see it approach the ship directly in a hostile
attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud
explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from
the port side of the ship. I immediately ordered the
general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I
went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the
port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately
noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed
on the 01 level, portside amidships, were burning
furiously. It was evident that it would not be
possible to reach the quick release lever by
proceeding down the outside port ladders of the
ship. I ordered the Executive Officer to go to the
starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01
level, cross over to the port side, and there release
the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'CONNOR was still on
the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and
both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge,
03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top
of the ladder to proceed down the ship received an
apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat
stowed on the 02 level starboard side, immediately
aft of the bridge. Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. O'CONNOR and
others in the bridge area were thrown back into the
bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were
blown from their feet.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] At this time I ordered a person,
who I believe to have been LT BENNETT, to report to
CNO via the highcom that LIBERTY was under attack by
unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate
assistance was required. I do not recall whether I
ordered any course changes to have the ship zig-zag
or not. One helmsman was seriously injured in the
starboard bridge bomb blast, and he was replaced by
Quartermaster Third BROWN. I do not recall who had
the helm at the time of the initial attack.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] The response of the crew to
general quarters was very expeditious. I do not
recall whether all of the bridge personnel ever
arrived on station or not, but the public address
system, the 21MC, and most sound powered phone
circuits were severed or destroyed during the initial
first or second of the total number of six to eight
strafing attacks that occurred.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] It seemed to me that the attacks
were made in a crisscross fashion over the ship, with
each attack coming at approximately forty-five second
to one minute intervals. After the starboard bridge
bomb hit, I ordered personnel to be organized for a
fire fighting party to put out the fire in the
vicinity of the whaleboat. The whaleboat was burning
furiously.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] It is estimated that the total
air attack was completed in approximately five to six
minutes.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] About midway during the attack,
Ensign LUCAS was noted on the bridge and at that time
he became my assistant and assisted me in every way
possible. Runners were used to relay my orders to the
repair parties, to main control and other vital
stations.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] Sometime after the starboard
bridge bomb hit while on the starboard side of the
Pilothouse, another attack from the starboard quarter
proceeding forward was made and I was hit with flying
shrapnel. I was not knocked off my feet, I was only
shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit,
but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any
consequence. I noticed slight burns on my starboard
forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers
right leg. Since I could walk and there was no
apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to
these minor injuries.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] Shortly after this I opened the
bridge safe and took out a camera which was
maintained on the bridge to take pictures of foreign
ships and aircraft. I immediately took the camera to
the port wing of the bridge and there was able to
take several pictures of the planes as they had
passed over the ship after their attack. In an effort
to obtain documentary evidence to establish the
identify of the aircraft, I retained this camera in
my possession throughout the reminder of the attack.
Later I took pictures of the torpedo boats before and
after the torpedo attack, also the helicopters which
approached the ship after the attack was over. This
film has been turned over to the USS AMERICA for
development and further disposition.
[CAPT. McGonagle:] On what appeared to be the
last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical
object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was
passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship.
This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to
100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no
explosion from this object, but it shattered into
several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have
been an empty wing tank but I am not certain of this.
141? [LOG:] BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS.
1424 [LOG:] 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD 1BEAM
DISTANCE 4 -5 MILES
[CAPT. McGonagle:] In the latter moments of the air
attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were
approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative
bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about
15 miles. The ship at the time was still on course
283 true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess
of five knots. At no time did the ship stop during
the air attack. It is believed that the time of
initial sighting of the torpedo boats, the time was
about 1420. The boats appeared to be in a wedge type
formation with the center boat the lead point of the
wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to
30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards
apart. [LT. Golden:] After completing general
quarters, I came from the engineering and went to the
port side of the ship, the motor whaleboat started
smoking instantly, and walked into the wardroom to
have a quick cup of coffee before going to my office.
I sat down in the forward part of the wardroom, and I
had no more had set down when the word was passed to
stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing.
Immediately, there was a bang, and the first thought
came to my head that the whaleboat had been dropped
into the water. I jumped to the porthole, looked
out, and there was black smoke coming up from the
side of the ship. I immediately ran to the door to
the wardroom to go outside. The second I hit the
door, I heard the word passed, "General Quarters, all
hands man your battle stations." And then the alarm
went off.
[LT. Golden:] Before I had gotten clear of the door,
the word was also passed over the PA system, which
sounded like the Commanding Officer's voice, telling
radio central to notify high command that we were
under air attack.
[LT. Golden:] When I hit the deck plate in the
engineroom main control in front of the throttle
board at 1405, I knew it was this time because the
tachometers were ringing up at the same time flank
speed. I had informed over the 1MC the Captain it
would take me a couple of minutes to bring the other
boiler on the line, as we had just secured it to
repair a gasket. The Commanding Officer told me to
get it on as soon as possible and give him all the
turns possible.
[LT. Golden:] Within a few minutes we were doing 86
rpms, until there was a hit and I lost electrical
power. We went dead in the water.
Counsel for the Court: Would you please read
pertinent extracts from these logs?
[LT. Golden:] Aye, sir. In the engineering smooth
log on the 12 to 1600 watch on 8 June 1967 - The log
is signed by R. J. BROOKS, Machinist Mate Chief,
1405 [ENG. LOG:] general quarters under attack.
1406 [ENG. LOG:] granted permission to fire room to
light fires in number two boiler.
1406 [ENG. LOG:] informed throttleman to maneuver at
various speeds, to draw steam no less than 400
pounds.
1407 [ENG. LOG:] reported condition Zebra set.
1408 [ENG. LOG:] secured number one and number two
distilling units in order to have more steam or
speed.
[Chief Lamkin:] Yes, sir, I was secured from GQ
drill shortly before the attack and at the time of
the attack I was in the disbursing office, I noticed
the initial shock and immediately headed for my GQ
station which is repair three. As I was going to my
GQ station the word was passed that we were being
attacked by aircraft. Upon arriving to my GQ station
I immediately started dispensing the gear, settling
the men down.
Q. Your GQ station is where?
[Chief Lamkin:] Repair Three. After there we got
together. We had the men lay low on the deck, you
could hear the strafing. At this time the word was
passed that they had a fire in shaft alley and I took
approximately four men and went down to shaft alley.
The fire in shaft alley was under control in a matter
of minutes. When I came back up they were calling
for stretcher bearers and the men were dispensed for
that. At this time they said they had a fire on the
bridge in the motor whale boat and they were calling
for assistance. I took repair three alpha plus some
other men that were there and headed for the motor
whale boat. As I was up an deck, portside by the U
boat I was knocked down by some sort of explosion. I
got up and went up and the men were already fighting
the fire in the whale boat. It was pretty well
destroyed at the time. As I was standing there we
were strafed again and one of the men to my left
fell. I don't remember his identity, he was picked
up and drug inside. I turned to run forward when I
came across the body of Mr. Toth who was pretty well
messed up. I remember getting kind of sick at my
stomach for a second or so. At this time I remember
they had the fire pretty well under control. I went
back down to my GQ which is repair three.
I don't remember any of the time lapse during that
time but I do remember them announcing to prepare
for a torpedo attack starboard side. [Ensign
Lucas:] Yes Sir. We had a general quarters drill
which secured shortly prior to 1400. After securing
from the drill I came to the wardroom and was in the
presence of Lieutenant Golden and Ensign Scott.
Ensign Scott left the wardroom and we heard the word
passed over the 1MC to stand clear of the motor
whaleboat while testing engines. Very shortly after
that word was passed we heard what sounded like a
very loud thump or crash. Mr. Golden and I half
jumped from our seats, we looked at each other, and
both thought that the motor whaleboat had fallen from
its davit onto the deck. We went to the closest
porthole, pulled the curtains, and did see some dust
and black smoke rising.
[Ensign Lucas:] It was at this time that the general
quarters alarm was sounded, and we knew that we had
been attacked. I went into the passageway outside
the wardroom via athwartships passageway to the
starboard side of the main deck and from there used
the ladder to go to the bridge, the 03 level. Upon
arriving on the bridge I got my battle helmet and my
life jacket from the starboard gear locker and was
just getting ready to go to my general quarters
station which is on the 04 level, the flying bridge.
We were hit by what I assume to be the second pass of
aircraft. Another man was next to me. I think he
was a signalman. We both hit the deck just outside
the starboard hatch leading to the pilothouse. Three
or four shells hit in our area. After that shelling
had ceased, I went into the pilothouse, didn't figure
it was too safe to go to the 04 level at that time.
Another pass was made and everyone in the pilothouse
hit the deck. When I did enter the pilothouse, the
officer of the deck for general quarters, LT.
O'CONNER, had already been injured and had been
carried into CIC, which is just aft of the
pilothouse. The junior officer of the deck at general
quarters, LT ENNES, was lying in the after portion of
the pilothouse and appears to have [deleted]. I
can't recall what other personnel were on the bridge
at that time. It consisted of several phone talkers
and a third class quartermaster, BROWN, was at the
helm, which was his general quarters station.
[Ensign Lucas:] I left the pilothouse, came to the
wardroom to learn the condition of LT. O'CONNER and
LT Ennis. Came down the ladder in the
superstructure. When I got to the 02 level, the men
were carrying the Executive Officer LCDR ARMSTRONG,
down to the wardroom for medical aid. At the time I
saw him, he appeared to be in shock, was very pale,
and was not saying anything. Mr. ENNES had gotten
partially down - they were having difficulty carrying
him down and he was in the passageway outside his
stateroom, waiting for attention to his leg. I came
into the wardroom and there were at least half a
dozen casualties in there being treated. Several of
the enlisted men had been in the spaces forward of
the superstructure, and the IC shop and the emergency
diesel room. These areas had been shelled very
heavily on one of the first passes. I found out the
emergency diesel did not work and that the gyro was
not functioning either.
[Ensign Lucas:] I left the wardroom area.
Somehow we received word that there was a fire
burning on the 01 level, port side. It was in the
vicinity where two 55 gallon drums of P-250 fuel was
stored. Some enlisted men in the passageways got a
hose and were putting out the fire. The fire had
spread aft of the P-250 cans and the four life rafts
were burning on the 01 level. I can't remember the
exact amount of time that I did spend in the
superstructure area. When I was in the passageways, I
hear we did receive some more shelling.
[Ensign Lucas:] I returned to the bridge. To the
best of my knowledge, when I did return to the
bridge, the only people present were the Commanding
Officer, one phone talker, who was lying on the deck
in the chart room, quartermaster BROWN on the helm
and myself. Before I went back to the bridge, we had
received word over the phones that were working, we
had very little communication as such, the 1MC was
hit and not functioning. The only communications we
had were via sound-powered phones. We had received
the word "standby for a torpedo attack".
[Ensign Lucas:] The Commanding Officer had been
injured in his right leg on what must have been the
first aircraft pass. He was bleeding profusely. The
Captain had been administered first aid and he had a
belt tourniquet around his leg. He insisted on being
everywhere that he could. He was on both wings, in
and out of the pilothouse, taking pictures. I
believe at the time I was giving orders to after
steering the bleeding had started again on the
Captains leg wound. I'm just theorizing that the
shell fragment that was lodged in the leg had been
discharged by his movement. We called the corpsman,
and the Captain was stretched out on the port wing,
being administered first aid. He was still calling
orders in to me to relay on to after steering.
Bleeding did stop and the Commanding Officer once
again was, well, this time he was placed in his chair
on the port wing. He gave orders there for quite
awhile.
Q. Backtracking to a point during the heat of combat,
did you observe the Captain when he was initially
wounded.
[Ensign Lucas:] Yes, I did.
Q. And he continued on in this condition without
stopping for assistance by medical?
[Ensign Lucas:] That is correct. It was quite
awhile before he did slow down enough to have the
belt tourniquet put on the leg. I assisted with that.
I used my belt, and after that a corpsman came up
just long enough to adjust the tourniquet and take a
look at the Commanding Officer. He did not want any
further medical attention and he did not receive any
more until the bleeding started a second time, when I
think the shell fragment was worked loose.
Q. In the first portion of your testimony, you
mention shelling, what did you intend to convey by
the word "shelling"?
[Ensign Lucas:] The first hit, the first noise that
LT GOLDEN and I heard when we were in the wardroom
was obviously a heavy hit. I assumed this was
aircraft and it sounded to us as if It hit on the
starboard side. Like I said, we thought it was the
motor whaleboat falling from its davit onto the deck.
I mentioned shelling again just as soon as I had put
on my battle helmet and life jacket on the bridge.
This again, I would say was aircraft cause there was
a whistling sound several seconds before the actual
burst and noise itself came. After I had gone inside
the pilothouse and was on the deck, there was another
series of whistling sounds preceding the hits. Here
again, I assume it was aircraft. When I had come
down to the wardroom, was lending a hand to getting
the hose to fight the fire on the port side, there
were more easily discernible whistling sounds, even
in the passageways, that were aircraft hits. The two
men who were handling the hose were keeping an eye
out for aircraft. They would put out the fire until
another plane came over and then they ducked back
inside.
Q. Do you have any idea how many aircraft were
involved?
[Ensign Lucas:] I did not actually see any of the
aircraft.
Q. During the time that you were on the bridge, did
you receive any lookout reports via sound-powered
telephones?
[Ensign Lucas:] During the attack?
Q. During the attack.
[Ensign Lucas:] When I got up to the bridge, as I
said I did not get to the 04 level which was my
general quarters station. During general quarters,
the two air lookouts were on the 04 level, but they
had not made it up there either. I cannot recall
seeing a surface lookout on either side of the bridge
when I got there. The shelling from the aircraft had
either injured them, or they had taken cover inside
the pilothouse.
[Ensign Lucas:] On the forward mounts, I said we had
no communications up there. My third class gunner's
mate, THOMPSON, according to several witnesses, and
to the members of repair two, which is located
directly beneath mount 51, said that petty officer
THOMPSON went to mount 51 when GQ sounded. He was
below decks. His station is with me on the 04 level.
Guess he figured he didn't have time to get up there.
He went to the closest gun and from the account given
by the people in repair two, it sounded as if he got
off half a box of ammo at the aircraft. They somehow
missed him on the first strafing attack. Several
witnesses said that he had the aircraft under fire
while it was circling for the second pass and it was
during the second pass that he was cut in half by a
rocket, but he had the aircraft under fire and got
off at least half a box of 50 caliber ammo.
Q. When did you receive your injuries?
[Ensign Lucas:] As soon as I had gotten to the
bridge and put on the battle helmet, I mentioned what
I assumed were rockets from the aircraft hit in the
immediate vicinity. I hit the deck and picked up
several pieces of [deleted] One of them was bleeding
enough that I took out my handkerchief and wrapped it
around [deleted].
[Ensign Lucas:] The piece of fragment that hit me in
the [deleted] occurred much later, after I had been
to the wardroom, returned to the bridge, and after
the quartermaster had been killed on the helm. The
commanding Officer came from the port wing into the
pilothouse, and he said "standby for another attack".
I don't recall if it was surface, air, or torpedo.
He said "take cover". I heard some firing, some
ricocheting off the starboard side. I assumed it was
from the patrol craft. I was in the rear portion of
the pilothouse and tried to crawl behind the water
fountain as best I could, and I got most of me back
when I felt something hit me just to the right of
[deleted] it started bleeding rapidly. I tore off
the [deleted] over the wound and just continued on
from there.
President:. Q. A question if you please - would you
be kind enough to expand on the performance of duty
of a young man mentioned earlier in your testimony,
named LARKINS?
[Ensign Lucas:] Seaman LARKINS helps man mount 54,
03 level, port side, as his general quarters station.
He was on that mount, and stayed on that mount, until
the fire coming from the 01 level chased him away.
He did recall seeing a plane approaching from the
port side and lobbing a cylinder that was attached
under the wing. A cylinder five to six feet long,
approximately ten inches in diameter. This cylinder
approached the 01 level port side in an end over end
fashion. After it hit, and the fire started, he
climbed over the skylight to mount 53 and helped the
gun crew there until the fire from the motor
whaleboat drove all people away from that mount. I
later personally saw him helping to extinguish the
fire on the port side and still later, he, by
himself, manned mount 51 and fired one shot before he
received a cease fire from the Commanding Officer.
Some place between 1335 and 1350 I again assumed con
from Mr. ENNIS.
[Ensign O'Mallery:] At about 1402, 03, or 04,
something like that, I was looking at the radar
screen, and trying to get a fix. I noticed three
contacts coming off the shore and I said, "Lloyd, I
think I have three contacts here." He said, "I think
I'll talk to the gun mounts on the phone circuits."
He tried to talk to them, and before I knew it, just
as he was about to say "gun mounts 51 and 52" a jet
opened up. It was just, "boom, boom, boom, boom,
boom, boom, boom," and all of a sudden I found myself
down on one knee. Someone yelled general quarters, I
yelled general quarters, and I left the bridge, and
as I went passed, I noticed that the general alarm
was sounding. I went into CIC. To return to what
had elapsed, well, by the time I took over the con it
was 12 o'clock, and the time I was relieved it was
approximately 1345. [LTJG. Painter:] Yes sir. I
was at this time, the officer of the deck. I had the
12 to 1600 watch that afternoon, and we had had a
practice general quarters drill at 1300 and secured
from that at approximately 1345, 1350. And during
general quarters I left the bridge and went to my
general quarters station, which is repair three,
located on the mess docks. After this drill was
over, I went back up to the bridge to relieve the
watch, and when I came up to the bridge, I was
Q. What time was that?
[LTJG. Painter:] Sir, I think it was 1350,
thereabouts. I came back up to the bridge and
relieved Mr. O'CONNOR who was the general quarters
OOD, and assumed the watch. The first thing I was
concerned with was getting a fix, and I remember
distinctly checking the radar, and the nearest point
of land on the radar at approximately 1355 was 17.5
miles. And I remember distinctly asking the Captain
if I could come back to our base course, which I
believe was set at about 14 and a half miles. We
were about three miles outside of base course. About
this time, it was around 1400, the Captain was on the
starboard wing. He was watching some jet aircraft.
The Captain was on the starboard wing, and he was
looking up in the air at a couple of jet aircraft.
He called me out there and said, "you'd better call
the forward gun mounts." He said "I think they're
going to attack," or words to that effect. So, I ran
into the bridge area and tried to call the port and
starboard gun mounts forward. I couldn't get them; I
called them about three times, and about the third
time I said, "bridge, gun mounts 51 and 52." They
were hit. I can't testify exactly which one was hit
first, port or starboard; they were both hit so fast.
I believe the starboard one was hit first. At this
time, I still had the phone in my hand, I was looking
through the porthole at the gun mounts. I was
looking through the porthole when I was trying to
contact these two kids, and I saw them both; well, I
didn't exactly see them as such. They were blown
apart, but I saw the whole area go up in smoke and
scattered metal. And, at about the same time the
aircraft strafed the bridge area itself. The
quartermaster, Quartermaster third class POLLARD was
standing right next to me, and he was hit, evidently
with flying glass from the porthole. I don't know why
I came out without a scratch. I was standing, as I
said, right next to him. Finally, about this time
they started strafing and we both hit the deck, as
well as Mr. O'MALLEY, who was my JOOD at the time.
As soon as the first strafing raid had been made, we
sounded general quarters alarm. The Captain was on
the bridge, He was in the pilot house at this time.
I don't know whether he was hit then or not, I can't
remember. It was so smokey.
[LTJG. Painter:] I took off for my general
quarters station, which, as I said before, was repair
three on the mess decks. On the way down I was
running as fast as I could. By the time I got to the
Chief's Lounge, the entrance through the lounge to
the mess docks, I saw SPICER, our postal clerk, lying
there cut in half with strafing and the hospital
corpsman was applying mouth to mouth resuscitation.
This I later found out failed. He died right there.
[LTJG. Painter:] Well, anyway, I got down to the
mess decks and all my men were assembling there as
fast as possible. They went to full battle dress,
and so did I. I can't recall exactly how long we
were waiting for the strafing raids to be over, but I
believe it was approximately 20 minutes.
[LTJG. Painter:] At this time someone, I believe it
was one of the quartermasters, came down and called
me to the bridge. He said, "the Captain's hurt and
the operations officer was dead, and the executive
officer was mortally wounded." I ran up to the
bridge. And when I got up there, the Captain was
laying on the stretcher up there while trying to get
underway. He thought for a while I think, I'm not
sure, that he would pass out, and he wanted somebody
up there to take over. He wanted somebody up there
in case he did. I'm not sure, but I think that is
why he had called me up there. I don't know whether
he called me up there, or the quartermaster just took
it on his own to get me up there. I never found out.
[LTJG. Painter:] So, I was up there for a few
minutes and it looked like the strafing raids were
over, and some of the people were coming out and
looking around and my repair chief had come out to
assess some of the damage. When I saw him an the 01
level aft, I told him to take over Repair Three as I
would be on the bridge. Well, by this times, the
Captain had regained consciousness and told me that I
would best be needed in Repair Three.
Q. Was that the Captain?
[LTJG. Painter:] Yes sir. So I left and went back
to Repair Three, and, I don't know how long, time was
slipping by so fast at this time, after that we had
our first torpedo attack.
[LT. Pfeiffer:] Well, we had secured from the
General Quarters drill. I was standing in the
passageway outside the pantry, which is on the main
deck. Suddenly, we heard a sound as a jet plane
flying low and the steward to whom I was talking and
myself thought that something had happened to one of
the steam lines. Immediately after that, we heard an
explosion, and we sounded general quarters.
[LT. Pfeiffer:] My general quarters station is on
the main deck aft, the main battle dressing station.
I went across the main deck, and at that point I saw
another plane passing over the ship and letting loose
its supply of rockets on the ship. It was passing
from the starboard bow to the port side and aft.
[LT. Pfeiffer:] I went into the main dressing
station as quickly as possible and awaited the flow
of casualties that would come in. We sent the third
class corpsman to the forward battle dressing station
which was in the wardroom. In the main dressing
station was the first class corpsman and myself.
When I was in the main battle dressing station, we
were relatively sealed off and we didn't hear very
much of what was happening outside. At that point I
would have thought it was a single or two planes that
had strafed the ship once or twice. I didn't have an
idea exactly how much had been done. And when they
brought in the first aid patient who was a seaman
with a collapsed lung, we thought he would be one of
the few casualties that we got, and immediately took
care of him, which involved an incision in his chest
and packing of a pretty good sized chest cavity to
remove the blood and air to make it possible for him
to breathe again.
[LT. Pfeiffer:] We then found Mr. Watson, who had
the combination to our narcotics safe in the medical
storeroom. I sent the corpsman to get Mr. Watson to
got me a supply of morphine and we started
administering to the men. The time at this time was
about a quarter to two, and it would be before the
torpedo had struck.
[LT. Pfeiffer:] Someone told me that they wanted me
on the bridge, and to get there I went through the
mess decks which had a number of casualties there
already, I passed the wardroom and found the forward
battle dressing station was somewhat flooded by
casualties, and went to the bridge where at that
point, the Captain was the only person who was still
functioning and the Captain had helm. Again, the
Captain had not been injured at that time. I took a
look outside the bridge and saw two decks below the
remains of our Navigator, Mr. Toth. The helmsman had
died where he stood at the helm, and at that time
there wasn't anything I could do for any of the men
on the bridge except administer morphine to those who
were injured and yet living and get men up with
stretchers to evacuate them. It so happened the fire
in the starboard side, the men had under control, and
I returned to the wardroom where again we started
caring for the casualties as best we could. We took
care of the men in the wardroom and in the passageway
on the main deck there were men wounded sitting
shoulder to shoulder the full ???? ?????? of the
passageway. On the port side in a stretcher was the
executive officer who had compound fractures of three
bones on one leg and two bones on the other leg, the
senior research officer, Mr. Lewis, who had
semi--flash burns of his face and had been
temporarily blinded, and all the men that had been
injured.
[LT. Pfeiffer:] I found our third class corpsman,
Shulman, with our mail clerk, Spicer, who had
suffered [deleted] and was [deleted] Shulman was
performing, or had finished performing [deleted] him
breathe.
President: Shulman's a third class?
[LT. Pfeiffer:] Yes sir. And, one of the other men
had his arm in a sling and was operating the
foot-powered suction pump enabling him to activate
the man's trachean lungs to get the secretions from
there.
President: Doctor, is this the foot-powered trachean
pump which supports the microphone into which you are
speaking?
[LT. Pfeiffer:] Yes sir. Sir, in the chief's mess,
we found another man, this was Payon, who was also
having difficutly breathing. He had a [deleted]
that time we did not have the facilities on board to
care for a second [deleted] so the only thing I could
do at that point was [deleted]. There was another man
with a broken leg who we were just able to splint.
As it turns out the last thing that we bought before
we left Norfolk was a supply of air splints that were
just coming in and being used as many as we had, and
we could have used more. Then I returned to the main
dressing station. At this time again I was going
through the mess decks and there were more people
there. I got to the main dressing station and found
people on the floor, people in the beds, in the
isolation room, and the clean room. One of the men
in the bed was Blanchard, a man who had sustained
[deleted] The first class corpsman and I had examined
him and we realized that we might have to operate on
him. At that point we had also agreed though, unless
it was an absolute matter of being certain he would
die otherwise, we would not do anything to him. Then
someone told me in a moment that the wardroom had
been hit, and that the Captain had been hit. We went
by the wardroom and found fortunately that the hit
had been away from where the people were being taken
care of.
[Ensign Scott:] After we secured from general
quarters, I came in to the wardroom and I just left
when I heard the first hit. With that, I took off
running to DC central. I did not come topside again
until about 0500 the following day.
Presidents: Tell us a little bit about your damage
control measures when the ship was hit from
starboard.
[Ensign Scott:] Yes sir. When we were first hit, the
first orders we got were, "two fires, one port side
in the vicinity of the gas drums, one starboard side
vicinity of the motor whaleboat." I ordered fire
fighting parties out. Next we were ordered to pick up
the wounded. We had a number of calls, repeated
calls to pick up the wounded. I called back and said
that every available stretcher was in use. They were
using blankets and mattresses to haul the people
back. After the fires were out, they burned for
quite awhile before we got them under control.
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir. On that date at
approximately 1400 local time, we had heard a loud
blast. I was in radio central at the time with my
second class who was on watch at the time. We
immediately set Zulu and closed the porthole covers,
and as soon as we had gotten them closed, the second
blast sounded and the word was passed on the 1MC to
pass over hicom that we were being attacked, to any
station. I immediately picked up the hicom
transmitter which was on UIC 32, auxiliary radio. We
started to transmit with it. No station heard us,
and five minutes or so later the transmitter was
reported to have blown out. I immediately switched
to a work two transmitter in the transmitter room,
and we couldn't get out on that either, so, in
between attacks by this time, I had went down to
transmitter room and I found or discovered that
somebody had accidentally knocked the frequency dial
one KC off. I corrected this and ran back to the
radio shack and we got hold of stations schematics on
which we passed the attack message. We did
authenticate, and he authenticated correctly because
he got a roger for it, my second class. Immediately
after that, after we passed the word on the bridge
that the message had got out, we had a power failure.
After the power failure, I discovered that my control
lines, remote lines were disconnected or in some way
inoperable, so we passed control on the transmitter
direct, but we still maintained a receiver on hicom.
From that time on we passed all our traffic from the
transmitter room and at 1227 they took control.
Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see
the national colors flying?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir. At the time I ran out of
the radio central space to the transmitter room.
Q. What time was this?
[Chief Smith:] I would say about 1225, this was
about two minutes either way. And this was Zulu time
because I'm basing it on the log here. I had
occasion to look at it because I was under the
impression we were being attacked by UAR, and I
wanted to see, and by the time that report came down
to us from the bridge that they were Israelis, I
wanted to check myself personally to see if our flag
was flying because I couldn't understand it. For
some reason I saw the flag flying at that time. If
this was the original flag or not, I do not know sir.
Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have with
you today in your custody the radio log for the 8th
of June 1967 for the USS LIBERTY?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir, I do. I have the original
log from 1227Z on, and I have the smooth log covering
the total time at 1158Z. At this time, from 1158Z to
1227Z, it is a reconstruction and we did not keep a
log in radio central.
Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the
original radio log exhibit number 23, and the smooth
log exhibit number 24. I now request that they be
admitted into evidence and request you read the
pertinent times to the Court.
[Chief Smith:] In our log 0430Z was the last
entry, on hicom log. At 1158Z is when we started to
call any station, this is ROCK STAR. We passed a
Zulu precedence to this message. At 1200Z ROCK STAR
was called by schematic saying "you are garbled".
"Say again". We repeated three times to them that we
were under attack. At 1204Z we had to switch
transmitters. We called at 1208Z schematic and
repeated three times that we were under attack.
Immediately after 1208Z, still in the same minute,
they rogered for the message. At 1209Z we repeated
again we are under attack and this time we added "we
need immediate assistance". At this time schematic
asked ROCK STAR for authentication, at which time we
gave them the correct authentication. At 1214Z they
rogered that. About 1217Z we called schematic again
saying "be advised that we have been hit by torpedo,
listing about 9 degrees, request immediate
assistance". At 122OZ this message was received and
rogered for. At 1224Z three unidentified aircraft
approached the ship. We told this to schematic. At
1227Z they rogered for that message and that's when
we had our power failure. We immediately shifted to
the transmitter room.
Assistant Counsel for the Court: Which hicom?
A. E4.4.
Q. You're sure chief - the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net -
E4.4?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir. E4.4 At 1233Z we had
placed the emergency destruction bill in effect and I
took it upon myself, not having any communications
with the bridge, to hold emergency destruction. I
only started emergency destruction on phase 1 and
phase 2, which does not include unclassified matter.
It only included RPS material that I had on hand.
Well, we started to burn, and then the word came down
from the bridge, finally, that there was never any
order given to do this, so I had them halt and
replaced all the ashes and the foreign material in
the weighted bags.
Q. Did you throw anything over the side?
[Chief Smith:] No sir. Nothing was thrown over the
side. I have everything that we had up there. From
1233Z until 1323Z no signals were sent or received
via hicom. All the traffic that we wanted to get out
was out by the time the attack was over. At 1355
power was restored, passed down from radio central
that the phone was inoperable and we shifted the
control to transmitter room complete. By this I mean
we had the receiver earlier. We gave them the
receiver too.
Q. Did you note any Jamming on the hicom circuit?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir. We did have jamming in my
estimation. I was unable to determine this exactly,
but every time it seems when an attack was made on
us, or a strafing run, it was preceded by, anywhere
from 25 to 30 seconds, carrier on our hicom circuit,
and I had ascertained to check this by calling the
transmitter room and they said that they had not
keyed the transmitter. This prevailed during the
attack and quite a bit after the attack,
intermittently.
Assistant Counsel for the Court: Chief, can you tell
me ordinarily what circuits are you normally up on?
[Chief Smith:] We're normally up on hicom, and we
carry 500KCS receive only for distress and our 243.0
and 121.5 distress. On this occasion we had 339.4
set up, which, I'm not sure what frequency it is but
it's a COMSIXTHFLT frequency.
Q. This is is addition to the hicom?
[Chief Smith:] This is in addition to the hicom,
yes. And we did have 277.8 fleet common up at the
time.
Q. You said that at the time 1204, I understood you
said that prior to that time you had transmitted an
attack report to schematic?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir.
Q. Did they acknowledge?
[Chief Smith:] I am not able to say right now.
Q. And you said that you did not authenticate under
initial transmission?
[Chief Smith:] No Sir, we did not.
Q. Authentication took place at time 1214?
[Chief Smith:] That's when they rogered for it, yes
sir. We authenticated at 1209.
Q. Were you challenged?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir, we were challenged by
schematic.
Q. And at 1214 they rogered for your
authentication?
[Chief Smith:] Yes sir. The first rogered
transmission was at time 1208 and the first rogered
authenticated transmission was at time 1214 on the
CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net between LIBERTY and schematic
--CTU 60.2.9.
[Chief Thompson:] We had just secured from general
quarters drill and I had gone on main deck with petty
officer HAROLD to discuss training and some of the
attitudes toward training, when I heard a rocket come
past and hit. At this time, I wasn't sure it was a
rocket. I thought it was a shore battery, and I was
either knocked down or I ducked quick. Then I got up
and started running across the deck to repair two
locker which is inside the forecastle. I was knocked
down again, but made it inside to start breaking out
the damage control equipment, getting stretcher
bearers on deck, and taking stock of the situation.
The attack appeared to last, I would say about 20
minutes to half an hour. Time is difficult to
recall.
[LTJG. Watson:] Well, we had a practice GQ
approximately 1310. My GQ station was the fire room
down in the engine room. When we had secured from
the practice GQ, I had come up.
[LTJG. Watson:] I was standing by the wardroom
pantry when the attack came. I ran back down the
officer's ladder and went down to my station in the
fire room.
[LTJG. Watson:] And shortly I was called up to sick
bay. I'm narcotics custodian, and I had to open the
narcotics locker. I came up from the fire room, went
through the mess decks, up to sick bay. I got the
key from the first class corpsman, and a seaman
KERNER went with me back down to the mess decks,
forward along the passageway, into the engineering
berthing compartment, down the hatch, into the
narcotics locker. I opened the locker, removed
morphine, gave half of it to KERNER and told him to
go on back up and I took the other half and left the
safe unlocked but closed. I locked the door behind
me, I came back up. As I passed by DC Central, I
stopped in there and told them I had opened xray
fittings to get down to the narcotics locker and had
reclosed it.
[LTJG. Watson:] At this time, DC Central is just
forward of the diagnostic room, under which the
torpedo hit. And at this time the torpedo had not
hit the ship cause I would have known it because of
the way the passageway was torn up. I went back up
into sick bay with the morphine that I had, and gave
the key back to the first class corpsman and told him
what I had done and that I had left the locker open.
There was a seaman laying on the operating table, and
they didn't have too many people helping in sick bay
at the time, so I helped them move the seaman off the
operating table, and I helped move third class
gunners mate EASON onto the operating table. The
Doctor told me where to get two bottles that he
wanted. I thought we were done. And I helped him
prepare things for operation, and by that time more
people had just come into the sick bay to help out.
So I said, "If you don't need me, I need to go back
to my GQ station." And he said at the time, "go
ahead".
FINDINGS:
19. Aircraft attack on LIBERTY Attack initiated by
single aircraft, making a run similar to previous
overflights. First warning that this aircraft had
attacked ship was a rocket explosion abaft the
bridge, port side. In five of six attacks, from
various angles, two or more jet aircraft at a time
conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks.
24. From the time of first air attack onward,
attackers were well coordinated, accurate and
determined. Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun
runs from both bows, both beams, and quarters
effectively chewed up entire topside including ship
control and internal communications (sound powered)
network. Well directed initial air attacks had wiped
out the ability of the four 50 cal. machine guns to
be effective.
45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the
air and surface attacks combined first to wipe out
defense and shipboard control capabilities, followed
by the crippling blow of a torpedo.
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