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Analysis of ATTACK ON THE LIBERTY
Broadcast by Thames Television
Rex Bloomstein, Producer/Director
by Joseph L. Meadors
Past President
USS LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION
USS LIBERTY survivors interviewed:
1) Lloyd Painter (Officer of the Deck during attack)
2) James M. Ennes, Jr. (Officer of the Deck morning of 8 June 1967)
3) George Golden (Engineering Officer)
4) Phil Tourney (Petty Officer)
5) Dr. Richard Kiepfer (Medical Officer)
6) Stan White (Senior Chief Petty Officer)
7) Joseph Lentini (Petty Officer)
8) John Hrankowski (Petty Officer)
9) Wayne Smith (Chief Petty Officer)
10) John Scott (Damage Control Officer)
Israeli personnel interviewed:
1) Unidentified Former Flight Engineer (Israeli Air Force)
2) Pinchas Pincasy (Former Naval Liaison Officer with Israeli Air Force)
3) Avraham Lunz (Former Duty Officer Naval HQ, Haifa)
4) Issy Rahav (Former Israeli Chief of Naval Operations)
5) Moshe Oren (Former Commander of Torpedo Boat Flotilla)
6) General Yeshayahu Bareket (Former Head of Israeli Air Force Intelligence)
7) Aharon Yifrach (Former Torpedo Boat Communications Officer)
8) Colonel Shmuel Kislev (Former Head of Israeli Air Force Operations)
9) Admiral Shlomo Erel (Former Head of Israeli Navy)
ANALYSIS
The Israelis repeatedly asserted that there was no flag flying on
the LIBERTY.
The anonymous "Former Flight Engineer" stated there was "no
flag on the ship."
General Yeshayahu Bareket, Former Head of Israeli Air Force
Intelligence, stated, "There was no flag on the ship. The
question was asked and repeated and repeated again and again.
Are you sure you can't see any flag are you sure you can't see
any kind of identification. And all the words came back - no."
Chief Petty Officer Melvin Smith was the USS LIBERTY's leading
enlisted cryptologist. Chief Smith, and the radio intercept
operators under his command, overheard the Israeli pilots
reporting back to their base that we were flying an American
flag.
Narrator: "Here in Tel Aviv the Air Force, which apparently had not
been told that the Liberty had been recognized, was
becoming concerned about reports from its own pilots of an
unidentified spy ship."
The Report of the Israeli 1967 Preliminary Inquiry (the Yerushalmi
Report 1/67 dated July 21, 1967) states:
"At 1055 hours the Naval Liaison Officer at Air Force H.Q.
reported to the Navy H.Q. that the ship about which he had
reported earlier in the morning was an electromagnetic
audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy, named Liberty, whose
marking was GTR-5. At the same time the Acting Chief of Naval
Operations was present at Navy H.Q."
According to the documentary, the Air Force had not been notified
that the Liberty had been recognized, while the Report of the
Israeli inquiry states that it is the Air Force who reported the
identification of the Liberty to the Navy.
General Yeshayahu Bareket was emphatic that he contacted the
American Embassy before the attack to find out if there were any US
Navy ships in the area.
At the time this claim was first made (immediately after the
attack) it caused great consternation in the US State
Department and was the subject of several messages including
AMEB Tel Aviv serial 4178 JUN 67, USDAO Tel Aviv 161945Z JUN
67, and AMEMB Tel Aviv 162000Z which said flatly: "No request
for info on U.S. ships operating off Sinai was made until after
Liberty incident. Had Israelis made such an inquiry, it would
have been forwarded immediately to the Chief of Naval
Operations and other high naval commands and repeated to the
Department (of State)."
Avraham Lunz (Former Duty Officer Naval HQ, Haifa): "I got on duty
in the morning about 8:00. The situation was very calm. I had some
old information. One of them was about an AGI, Intelligence
Gathering Ship, American Type, in the southern part of the area.
The information was quite old. It was dated 6 hours this morning.
At around 11:00, checking the situation and knowing that no ship
would stay on its place, and five hours old information was quite
old, we took it off without knowing where it went."
Admiral Shlomo Erel (Former Head of Israeli Navy): "The description
of the Liberty sailing innocently in broad daylight is all so very
picturesque but this wasn't the case. This was the heart of
fighting, with aircraft flying overhead all the time in the heart of
a war area."
Admiral Erel would have you believe that aircraft were flying all
over the place, yet none of them reported seeing the Liberty between
the hours of 6:00 and 11:00.
Issy Rahav, Former Chief of Naval Operations, ordered the dispatch
of three Motor Torpedo Boats from Ashdod "at about 1200." He
ordered them to "sail and see whether they can see anything in the
area."
Moshe Oren, Former Commander of the Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla,
stated that "we were actually ordered to find this ship that is
bombarding the shore, our forces, and destroy it. That was the
order."
The Yerushalmi Report:
"At 1205 hours an order was given to three torpedo boats of the
division at Ashdod to proceed in the direction of El-Arish.
Reports about the shelling continued to reach
G.H.Q./Operations, and pressure was exerted on the Naval
representative, on the lines that 'the coast has been shelled
for hours, and you - the Navy - are not reacting.' The Naval
representative contacted Navy H.Q. and proposed an immediate
action. He was informed that torpedo boats had been sent to
the spot to locate the target, and it had also been agreed with
the Naval representative at Air Force H.Q. that as soon as the
torpedo boats locate the target, aircraft would be dispatched."
In 1982, The Israel Defense Forces History Department Research and
Instruction Branch issued a report on the USS LIBERTY incident. On
page 10 of that report, it states
"Division 914 ('Pagoda' on the radio code), under the command
of Commander Moshe Oren, consisted at that time of three
torpedo boats - T203, T204 and T206; the flagship was T204,
with the Division commander aboard. The Division had left
Ashdod Port at 1120 hours, with the task of patrolling between
Ashdod and Ashkelon." (emphasis added) Elsewhere, "Division
914 continued on her way to El-Arish and after an hour's
sailing (at 1317 hours) she was informed (by Naval
Operations/3) of the shelling from the sea, of El-Arish."
Aharon Yifrach, Former Torpedo Boat Communications Officer, located
the LIBERTY on radar at a range of 22 miles "about an hour later"
(this would be about 1300 hours) and plotted the contact travelling
at 30 knots. He stated the contact "was running away west at high
speed, we cannot achieve it, our high speed was slower, and we asked
for support of aircraft."
The Yerushalmi Report:
"According to the division log-book, a target was located at
1341 hours situated at a distance of about 20 miles north of
El-Arish."
Not 1300 hours as stated by Yifrach.
The Israel Defense Forces History Department Report:
"At 1341 hours, the Division detected the target on its radar -
20 miles northwest of El-Arish and 14 miles off the coast of
Bardawil. The officer at the CIC on the flagship, Ensign
Yifrach Aharon (sic), reported that the target had been
detected at a range of 22 miles, that the target had been
tracked for a few minutes, after which he had determined that
the target was moving westward at a speed of 30 knots."
The torpedo boats were sent from Ashdod at 1200 hours. "About an
hour later" they had the Liberty on radar at a distance of 22 miles
travelling at 30 knots "in a westerly direction" which, according to
Yifrach, was faster than the fastest speed the torpedo boats could
attain. At this time the Liberty was 77 miles from Ashdod which
means that in order to have the ship on radar from 22 miles away,
the torpedo boats (with a maximum speed of less than 30 knots) would
have to travel the 55 miles in one hour. This is impossible.
Radar is line of sight (Radar waves do not follow the curvature
of the Earth). As a result, the maximum range of the Torpedo
Boat's radar is 12-15 miles. They did not come close enough to
detect the Liberty on radar until 1400 hours, and by that time
the attack was already underway.
Aharon Yifrach, "I reported to headquarters in Haifa that we found
the target, it's running away west at very high speed, we cannot
achieve it, our high speed was slower, and we asked for support of
aircraft."
The Yerushalmi Report:
"(The Naval representative) was informed that torpedo boats had
been sent to the spot to locate the target, and it had also
been agreed with the Naval representative at Air Force H.Q.
that as soon as the torpedo boats locate the target, aircraft
would be dispatched."
The Israel Defense Forces History Department Report:
"The Division Commander (Moshe Oren) was told to listen to the
air-sea-liaison radio channel (86 and 186) and that IAF planes
would be dispatched to the area after the target had been
detected by the Division."
Aharon Yifrach asserts that the aircraft were dispatched because the
torpedo boats reported that the contact was travelling at 30 knots
and the boats were not capable of achieving that speed. The two
other reports contradict this.
Colonel Shmuel Kislev states the pilots were told there was only one
ship in the area and, if they determined that the ship was "the
warship that had been shelling the shore of El Arish," they were
permitted to attack. During one of the strafing runs one of the
pilots reported that there was no flag flying. After that report,
the aircraft were ordered to halt the attack.
The Yerushalmi Report:
"The aircraft carried out a run over the ship in an attempt to
identify it. According to their statements, they were looking
for a flag but found none; likewise no other identification
mark was observed. As against this, it was established that
the painting of the ship was grey (the color of a warship), and
two guns were situated in the bow. This was reported to H.Q.
On the assumption that they were facing an enemy target an
order was given to the aircraft to attack."
Note that the Yerushalmi Report states that the pilots were
ordered to attack after they indicated they saw no flag flying,
but the pilots did not report seeing no flag until the last
strafing run (with napalm).
The Israel Defense Forces History Department Report:
"The two 'Mirage' aircraft reached the ship at approximately
1400 hours. The formation leader, Captain Spector, descended
to a height of 3,000 feet and circled the vessel twice; his
number two executed one identification run. These runs
revealed to the pilots that the ship was not an Israeli vessel
since she did not have the identifying markings (a white cross
on a red background). The ship was colored battleship grey,
had a foremast, one smokestack and two guns on her bow. No
flag or other identifying sign was discerned. The formation
leader reported this to the torpedo boats and Control and then
the aircraft received permission to attack." Elsewhere, "The
lack of response from the ship raised suspicions in the mind of
the formation leader and he decided to descend for an
identification run. In this first run he discerned letters on
the ship's bow but did not succeed in reading them clearly
although the marking looked like p-30. In order to be sure the
pilot descended for a second, slower identification run at a
height of about 30 meters and then he was able to discern the
letters CTR-5 ('Charley', 'Tango', 'Romeo') and reported this
to control. Although he searched for a flag or other
identification marking, he detected nothing."
Note that in the documentary, the pilot reported seeing CTR-5 during
the last strafing attack (even going to the extreme of providing
"transcripts" of the pilot's conversation). This is contradicted by
the Israeli Defense Forces History Department Report which states
that the pilot reported seeing CTR-5 when he made two special
identification runs over the ship.
The pilot's conversations were "recreated from transcripts."
Why was the conversation of the pilots recreated from the
transcripts instead of using the tapes themselves?
Two Torpedo Boat commanders, simultaneously and independently,
identified the Liberty as the El Quseir.
In a September 21, 1967 memo from Carl F. Salans, The Legal
Advisor in the United States Department of State, to the
Undersecretary of State, Mr. Salans writes:
"The Clifford report noted 'That the Liberty could have been
mistaken for the Egyptian supply ship El-Quseir is
unbelievable. El-Quseir has one-fourth the displacement of the
Liberty, roughly one-half the beam, is 180 feet shorter, and is
very differently configured. The Liberty's unusual antenna
array and hull markings should have been visible to low-flying
aircraft and torpedo boats. ...Trained Israeli naval personnel
should have been able easily to see and identify the larger
hull markings on the Liberty.'
"The Israeli report states that the initial speed of the target
reported by the torpedo boat commander at 1341 hours as 30
knots was verified within minutes and confirmed as a speed of
28 knots. The report notes that it was the speed of the target
which led to the final conclusion that there was no reason for
surmising that the target could possibly be the Liberty.
"The reported speed would have ruled out the "El Kasir" as the
target, as well as the Liberty, since the top speed of the
Kasir, published in Janes Fighting Ships, is in the range of 14
knots. The Liberty's top speed is 18 knots."
Commander Ernest Castle, US Military Attache in Tel Aviv at the time
of the attack states that if the Israelis really wanted to sink the
Liberty they would have attacked at night and, since they recently
wiped out the Egyptian military with such ease, they would have had
no problem sinking the ship.
Would the Israelis have waited until night to attack the Liberty?
Would the Israelis have waited until the Liberty had spent the
entire afternoon spying on them?
Instead of waiting for night, wouldn't they have jammed her radios?
They did.
Instead of waiting for night, wouldn't they have sent in fast attack
jets to destroy her antennas and wipe out her defensive
capabilities? They did.
Instead of waiting for night, wouldn't they have brought in torpedo
boats to sink the ship? They did.
Instead of waiting for night, wouldn't they have those torpedo boats
machine gun the Liberty's life rafts to insure there were no
survivors? They did.
SUMMARY
According to the 1982 Israeli Defense Force History Department Report,
"such an incident must be thoroughly investigated, that all the causes
of the tragic encounter must be examined, conclusions drawn, and proper
instructions issued which will prevent the occurrence of such an
incident in the future."
The questions raised by the Thames Documentary add support to this
argument. A complete investigation by the US Government is long
overdue.
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