|
| |
| |
They Dare to Speak Out
 click for where to buy
by Paul Findley
Chapter 7
THE ASSAULT ON ASSAULT
ALTHOUGH ISRAEL'S lobby seems able to penetrate our nation's
strongest defenses at will in order to gain the secret
information it wishes, when the lobby's objective is to keep
U.S. information secret from the world, our defenses suddenly
become impenetrable.
After thirty-five years, James M. Ennes, Jr., a retired
officer of the U.S. Navy, is still having difficulty prying
loose documents that shed light on the worst peacetime disaster
in the history of our navy. In this quest, he has encountered
resistance by the Department of Defense, the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, the book publishing industry, the news media, and the
Israeli Foreign Ministry. The resistance, seemingly coordinated
on an international scale, is especially perplexing because
Ennes's goal is public awareness of an episode of heroism and
tragedy at sea that is without precedent in American history.
As the result of a program of concealment supported by
successive governments in both Israel and the United States,
hardly anyone remembers the miraculous survival of the USS
Liberty after a devastating assault by Israeli forces on June
8, 1967, left 34 sailors dead, 171 injured, and the damaged
ship adrift with no power, rudder, or means of communication.
The sustained courage of Captain William L. McGonagle and
his crew in these desperate circumstances earned the Liberty a
place of honor in the annals of the U.S. Navy. But despite
energetic endeavors, including those of Ennes, who was officer
of the deck that day, awareness of the incident remains dim and
obscure. His stirring book-length account of the attack, Assault
on the Liberty, itself continues to be under heavy assault
twenty-two years after its publication.
The episode and its aftermath were so incredible that
Admiral Thomas L. Moorer, who became chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff a month after the attack, observes, "If it was
written as fiction, nobody would believe it."(1)
Certain facts are clear. The attack was no accident. The
Liberty was assaulted in broad daylight by Israeli forces who
knew the ship's identity.(2) The Liberty, an intelligence-
gathering ship, had no combat capability and carried only
light machine guns for defense. A steady breeze made its U.S.
flag easily visible. The assault occurred over a period of
nearly two hours--first by air, then by torpedo boat. The
ferocity of the attacks left no doubt: the Israeli forces
wanted the ship and its crew destroyed.
The public, however, was kept in the dark. Even before the
American public learned of the attack, U.S. government officials
began to promote an account of the assault that was satisfactory
to Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee worked
through congressmen to keep the story under control. The
president of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, ordered and
led a cover-up so thorough that sixteen years after he left
office, the episode was still largely unknown to the public--and
the men who suffered and died have gone largely unhonored.
The day of the attack began in routine fashion, with the
ship first proceeding slowly in an easterly direction in the
eastern Mediterranean, later following the contour of the
coastline westerly about fifteen miles off the Sinai Peninsula.
On the mainland, Israeli forces were winning smashing victories
in the third Arab-Israeli war in nineteen years. Israeli Chief
of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, announcing that the Israelis had taken
the entire Sinai and broken the blockade on the Strait of Tiran,
declared: "The Egyptians are defeated."(3) On the eastern front,
the Israelis had overcome Jordanian forces and captured most of
the West Bank.
At 6:00 A.M. an airplane, identified by the Liberty crew as
an Israeli Noratlas, slowly circled the ship, then departed. At
9:00 A.M., a jet appeared at a distance, then to the left of the
ship.(4) At 10:00 A.M., two rocket-armed jets circled the ship
three times. They were close enough for their pilots to be
observed through binoculars. The planes were unmarked. An hour
later the Israeli Noratlas returned, flying not more than 200
feet directly above the Liberty and clearly marked with the Star
of David. The ship's crew members and the pilot waved at each
other. The plane returned every few minutes until 1:00 P.M. By
then, the ship had changed course and was proceeding almost due
west.
At 2:00 P.M., all hell broke loose. Three Israeli Mirage
fighter planes headed straight for the Liberty, their rockets
taking out the forward machine guns and wrecking the ship's
antennae. The Mirages were joined by Mystere fighters, which
dropped napalm on the bridge and deck and repeatedly strafed the
ship. The attack continued for more than twenty minutes. In all,
the ship sustained 821 holes in her sides and decks. Of these,
more than 100 were rocket-sized.
As the aircraft departed, three torpedo boats took over the
attack, firing five torpedoes, one of which tore a forty-foot
hole in the hull, killing 25 sailors. The ship was in flames,
dead in the water, listing precariously, and taking on water.
The crew was ordered to prepare to abandon ship. As life rafts
were lowered into the water, the torpedo boats moved closer and
shot them to pieces. One boat concentrated machine gun fire on
rafts that were still on deck as crew members there tried to
extinguish the napalm fires. Petty Officer Charles Rowley
declares, "They didn't want anyone to live."
At 3:15 P.M., the last shot was fired, leaving the vessel a
combination morgue and hospital. The ship had no engines, no
power, no rudder. Fearing further attack, Captain McGonagle,
despite severe leg injuries, stayed at the bridge. An Israeli
helicopter, its open bay door showing troops in battle gear and
a machine gun mounted in an open doorway, passed close to the
deck, then left. Other aircraft came and went during the next
hour.
U.S. air support never arrived. The USS SARATOGA was only
thirty minutes away, and, with a squadron of fighter planes on
deck ready for a routine operation, it was prepared to respond
to an attack almost instantly. But the rescue never occurred.
Without approval by Washington, the planes could not take
aggressive action, even to rescue a U.S. ship confirmed to be
under attack. Admiral Donald Engen, then captain of the USS
AMERICA, a second U.S. carrier in the vicinity, later explained:
"President Johnson had very strict control. Even though we knew
the Liberty was under attack, I couldn't just go and order a
rescue."(5) The ship's planes were hardly in the air when the
voice of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was heard over
Sixth Fleet radios: "Tell the Sixth Fleet to get those aircraft
back immediately."(6) They were ordered to have no part in
destroying or driving off the attackers.
Shortly after 3:00 P.M., nearly an hour after the Liberty's
plea was first heard, the White House gave momentary approval to
a rescue mission, and planes from both carriers were launched.
At almost precisely the same instant, the Israeli government
informed the U.S. naval attache in Tel Aviv that its forces had
"erroneously attacked a U.S. ship" after mistaking it for an
Egyptian vessel, and offered "abject apologies." With the
apology in hand, Johnson once again ordered U.S. aircraft back
to their carriers.
When the second launch occurred, there were no Israeli
forces to "destroy or drive away." Fifteen hours of lonely
struggle to keep the wounded alive and the vessel afloat were
ahead for the Liberty and its ravaged crew. Not until dawn of
the next day would the Liberty see a U.S. plane or ship. The
only friendly visit was from a small Soviet warship. Its offer
of help was declined, but the Soviets said they would stand by
in case need should arise.
The next morning, two U.S. destroyers arrived with medical
and repair assistance. Soon the wounded were transferred to the
carrier hospital by helicopter. The battered ship then proceeded
to Malta, where a navy Court of Inquiry was to be held. The
inquiry itself was destined to be a part of an elaborate program
to keep the public from knowing what had really happened.
In fact, the cover-up began almost at the precise moment
that the Israeli assault ended. The apology from Israeli
officials reached the White House moments after the last gun
fired at the Liberty. President Johnson accepted and publicized
the condolences of Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, even
though readily available information showed the Israeli account
to be false; the CIA had learned a day before the attack that
the Israelis planned to sink the ship.(7) Nevertheless,
congressional comments largely echoed the president's inter-
pretation of the assault, and the nation was caught up in
euphoria over Israel's stunning victories over the Arabs.
The casualties on the Liberty got
scant attention. Smith Hempstone, foreign correspondent for the
WASHINGTON STAR, wrote from Tel Aviv, "In a week since the
Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, not one single Israeli of the
type which this correspondent encounters many times daily--cab
drivers, censors, bartenders, soldiers--has bothered to express
sorrow for the deaths of these Americans."(8)
The Pentagon staved off reporters' inquiries with the
promise of a "comprehensive statement" once the official
inquiry, conducted by Admiral Isaac Kidd, was finished.(9)
Arriving at Malta, Kidd gave explicit orders to the crew:
"Answer no questions. If somehow you are backed into a corner,
then you may say that it was an accident and that Israel has
apologized. You may say nothing else." Crew members were assured
they could talk freely to reporters once the summary of the
Court of Inquiry was made public. This was later modified. They
were then ordered not to provide information beyond the precise
words of the published summary.
The court was still taking testimony when a charge that the
attack had been deliberate appeared in the U.S. press.(10) An
ASSOCIATED PRESS story filed from Malta reported that "senior
crewmen" on the ship were convinced the Israelis knew the ship
was American before they attacked. "We were flying the Stars and
Stripes and it's absolutely impossible that they shouldn't know
who we were," a crew member said. The navy disputed the story,
saying the United States "thoroughly accepted the Israeli
apology."
With the testimony completed, Admiral Kidd handcuffed
himself to a huge box of records and flew to Washington where
they were examined by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
McDonald, as well as by congressional leaders before the
long-awaited summary statement was issued.(11) When it was finally
released, it was far from comprehensive.(12) It made no attempt to
fix blame, focusing instead almost entirely on the actions of
the crew.
The censored summary did not reveal that the ship had been
under close aerial surveillance by Israel for hours before the
attack, or that during the preceding twenty-four hours Israel
had repeatedly warned U.S. authorities to move the Liberty.(13)
It contained nothing to dispute the notion of mistaken identity.
The navy erroneously reported that the attack lasted only six
minutes instead of seventy minutes, and falsely asserted that
all firing stopped when the torpedo boats came close enough to
identify the U.S. flag. The navy made no mention of napalm or of
life rafts being shot up. It even suppressed records of the
strong breeze that made the ship's U.S. flag plainly visible.
The report did make one painful revelation: Before the
attack, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had ordered the Liberty to
move farther from the coast, but the message "was misrouted,
delayed, and not received until after the attack."(14)
Several newspapers criticized the Pentagon's summary. The
NEW YORK TIMES said it "leaves a good many questions
unanswered."(15) The WASHINGTON STAR used the word "cover-up,"
called the summary an "affront," and demanded a deeper and wider
probe.(16) Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, after a closed briefing by
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, called the episode "very
embarrassing." The STAR concluded: "Whatever the meaning of
this, embarrassment is no excuse for disingenuousness."
In early July, the Associated Press quoted Micha Limor,
identified as an Israeli reservist who had served on one of the
torpedo boats, as saying that Israeli sailors noticed three
numbers on the ship as they circled the Liberty, but insisted
that the numbers meant nothing to them.(17) Lieutenant James M.
Ennes, Jr., a cypher officer recovering in a hospital from
shrapnel wounds, was incredulous when he read the Limor story.
(18) He had been officer of the deck. He knew that the ship's name
appeared in large letters on the stern and that the hull number
was plainly visible on the bow. He knew also that a breeze made
the ship's U.S. flag easily visible during the day. He had just
ordered a new 5- by 8-foot flag displayed early on the day of
the attack. By the time the torpedo boats arrived, that flag had
been shot down, but an even larger (7- by 13-foot) flag was
mounted in plain view from a yardarm. He knew that the
attackers, whether by air or surface, could not avoid knowing it
was a U.S. ship. Above all, he knew that Liberty's intercept
operators had heard the Israeli reconnaissance pilots reporting
to Israeli headquarters that the ship was American.
Disturbed by the Limor account and the exchange of public
messages concerning the assault, Ennes determined to unravel the
story. During the four months he was bedridden at Portsmouth,
Virginia, he collected information from his shipmates. Later,
while stationed in Germany, he recorded the recollections of
other crew members. Transferred to Washington, D.C., he secured
government reports under the Freedom of Information Act, and he
also obtained the full Court of Inquiry report, which was finally,
after nine years, declassified from being top secret in 1976.
The result was Ennes's book, ASSAULT ON THE Liberty,
published in 1980, two years after he retired from the navy. I
first read the book while crossing the Atlantic as a member of a
congressional delegation. Amazed by its contents, I shared it
with several colleagues, who were equally astounded. Ennes
discovered "shallowness" in the court's questioning, and a,
failure to follow up "on evidence that the attack was planned in
advance," as well as evidence that interceptors from two radio
stations heard an Israeli pilot identify the ship as American.(19)
He wrote that the court ignored the ship's log, which recorded a
steady breeze blowing and included confirming testimony from
crewmen, and erroneously concluded that attackers may not have
been able to identify the flag's nationality: the flag,
according to the court, "hung limp at the mast on a windless
day."
Concerning Israeli motives for the attack, Ennes wrote that
Israeli officials may have decided to destroy the ship because
they feared its sensitive listening devices would detect Israeli
plans to invade Syria's Golan Heights. (Israel invaded Syria the
day after the Liberty attack, despite Israel's earlier
acceptance of a ceasefire with its Arab foes.) A BBC television
documentary titled DEAD IN THE WATER was broadcast several times
in England and in several European markets--but not in the
United States. The documentary reported a different theory:
Israel wanted to destroy the Liberty, confident that Egypt, not
Israel, would be blamed. Israel hoped this would provoke
sufficient American outrage against Egypt that the United States
would enter the war in alliance with Israel.
Ennes learned that crewmen sensed a cover-up even while the
Court of Inquiry was taking testimony at Malta.(20) He identified
George Golden, the Liberty'S engineering officer and acting
commanding officer, as the source of the Associated Press story
that charged that the attack was deliberate. Golden, who is
Jewish, was so outraged at the prohibition against talking with
reporters that he ignored it--risking his future career in the
navy to rescue a vestige of his country's honor.
The U.S. embassy at Tel Aviv relayed to Washington the only
fully detailed Israeli account of the attack--the Israeli Court
of Inquiry report known as "Israeli Preliminary Inquiry 1/67."
The embassy message also contained the recommendation that, at
the request of the Israeli government, the account not be
released to the American people.(21) Ennes believes this is
probably because both governments knew the mistaken identity
excuse was too transparent to believe.(22)
Another request for secrecy was delivered by hand to Eugene
Rostow, undersecretary of state for political affairs.(23) It
paralleled the message from the embassy at Tel Aviv, imploring
the Department of State to keep the Israeli Court of Inquiry
secret because "the circumstances of the attack [if the version
outlined in the file is to be believed] strip the Israeli navy
naked."(24) Although Ennes saw that message in an official file in
1977, by 1984 it had vanished from all known official files.
Ennes believes that Israeli officials decided to make the
Israeli navy the scapegoat in the controversy. With the blame
piled on its navy, the orphan service that has the least clout
in Israel's military hierarchy, Israel then asked the United
States to keep the humiliation quiet. United States officials
agreed not to release the text of the Israeli report.
LEGAL ADVISER'S REPORT BECOMES TOP SECRET
During this same period, in the weeks immediately following the
assault on the Liberty, an assessment of "Israeli Preliminary
Inquiry 1/67" was prepared by Carl F. Salans, legal adviser to
the secretary of state. It was prepared for the consideration of
Eugene Rostow. The report, kept top secret until 1983 and
apparently given only cursory examination by Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, examines the credibility of the Israeli study and
reveals as has no other single document the real attitude of the
U.S. government toward the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty. It
was a document too explosive to release.
Item by item, Salans demonstrated that the Israeli excuse
could not be believed. Preparing the report immediately after
the attack, he relied mainly on the limited information in
Admiral Isaac Kidd's Court of Inquiry file. Kidd never
interviewed Ennes, Golden, or any of the other principal
witnesses, but he found enough evidence to thoroughly discredit
the Israeli document. The factors that Salans examined were the
speed and direction of the Liberty, aircraft surveillance,
identification by Israeli aircraft, identification by torpedo
boats, flag and identification markings, and the time sequence
of attacks. In each instance, eyewitness testimony or known
facts disputed Israel's claims of innocent error.
For example, the Israeli report contended that the Liberty
was traveling at a speed of twenty-eight to thirty knots, hence
behaving suspiciously. Its actual speed was five knots. Israeli
reconnaissance aircraft claimed to have carried out only two
overnight missions, at 6:00 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. Aircraft actually
flew over the Liberty eight times before opening fire, the first
at 6:00 A.M. and the last at 1:00 P.M. The Israeli report
charged that the Liberty, after refusing to identify itself,
opened fire. Captain McGonagle testified that the only signals
by the torpedo boats came from a distance of 2,000 yards when
the attack run was already launched and torpedoes were on their
way. The Israeli torpedo boats' blinker signals could not be
seen because of intermittent smoke and flames. Not seeing them,
the Liberty did not reply. The Israeli report contended that the
Liberty did not display a flag or identifying marks. Five
crewmen testified that they saw the U.S. flag flying the entire
morning. When the flag was shot away during the air attack,
another, larger, flag was hoisted before the torpedo onslaught
began. Hull markings were clear and freshly painted. The
Israelis tried to shift responsibility by asserting that the
attack originated because of reports that the coastal area was
being shelled from the sea. Salans said it should be clear to
any trained observer that the small guns aboard the Liberty were
incapable of shore bombardment.
The Salans report was forwarded September 21, 1967, to
Undersecretary of State Rostow. This means that high officials
of the administration knew the falsity of Israeli claims about
the Liberty soon after the assault itself.
With a document in hand that so thoroughly refuted Israel's
claims, the next logical step obviously would be its
presentation to the Israeli government for comment, followed by
publication of the findings. Instead, it was stamped "top
secret" and hidden from public view, as well as from the
attention of other officials of our government and its military
services, along with the still-hidden Israeli report. Dean Rusk,
secretary of state at the time, says that he has "no current
recollection" of seeing the Salans report. He adds, however,
that he "was never satisfied with the Israeli purported
explanation of the USS Liberty affair."
The cover-up of the Salans report and other aspects of the
episode soon had agonizing implications for U.S. security. If
the navy had been candid about the Liberty episode even within
its own ranks, the nation might have been spared the subsequent
humiliation of an ordeal that began five months later when North
Korean forces killed a U.S. sailor and captured the USS PUEBLO
and its entire crew. The agony ended when the crew was released
after experiencing a year of captivity under brutal conditions.
PUEBLO commander Lloyd M. Bucher later concluded that, had
he been armed with the facts of the disaster in the
Mediterranean, he might have prevented the PUEBLO episode.(25) In
the late summer of 1967, still ashore but preparing to take
command of the ill-fated ship, Bucher learned of the Liberty's
misfortune. Headed for hostile waters near North Korea, he
believed his mission would profit from the experience and asked
for details. Bucher recalls how his request was brushed aside:
"I asked my superiors about the disaster and was told it was all
just a big mistake, that there was nothing we could learn from
it."(26) When he later read Ennes's book, Bucher discovered that
the Liberty crew had encountered many of the same problems his
ship faced just before its capture. Both ships had inadequate
means for destroying secret documents and equipment, and, in a
crisis, even the ship itself. Both had serious shortcomings in
control procedures. Bucher blames "incompetency at the top" and
"lack of response to desperate calls for assistance during the
attack." He speaks bitterly of the PUEBLO'S ordeal:
We had a man killed and fourteen wounded. Then a year
of pretty damned severe brutality, which could have been
prevented had I been told what happened to the Liberty.
It's only because that damned incident was covered up
as thoroughly as it was.
The cover-up of the attack on the Liberty had other, more
personal consequences. On recommendation of the U.S. Navy,
William L. McGonagle, captain of the Liberty, was approved by
President Johnson for the nation's highest award, the
Congressional Medal of Honor. According to Ennes, the captain
"defied bullets, shrapnel, and napalm" during the attack and,
despite injuries, stayed on the bridge throughout the night.
Under his leadership, the eighty-two crewmen who survived death
and injury had kept the ship afloat despite a forty-foot hole in
its side, and managed to bring the crippled vessel to safe
harbor.
McGonagle was an authentic hero, but he was not to get the
award with the customary style, honor, ceremony, and publicity.
It would not be presented personally by the president, nor would
the event be at the White House. The navy got instructions to
arrange the ceremony elsewhere. The president would not take
part. It was up to the navy to find a suitable place. Admiral
Thomas L. Moorer, who had become chief of naval operations
shortly before the order arrived, was upset.(27) It was the only
Congressional Medal of Honor that, in his experience, would not
be presented at the White House. He protested to Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara, but the order stood. No voice of
protest came from the legislature for which the medal is named.
The admiral would have been even more upset had he known at
the time that the White House delayed approving the medal until
it was cleared by Israel. Ennes quoted a naval officer as
saying: "The government is pretty jumpy about Israel. The State
Department even asked the Israeli ambassador if his government
had any objection to McGonagle getting the medal. 'Certainly
not,' Israel said."(28) The text of the accompanying citation
gave no offense: it did not mention Israel.
The secretary of the navy presented the medal in a small,
quiet ceremony at the navy yard in Washington. Admiral Moorer
said later that he was not surprised by the extraordinary
arrangements.(29) "They had been trying to hush it up all the way
through." Moorer added, "The way they did things, I'm surprised
they didn't just hand it to him under the 14th Street Bridge."
Even tombstone inscriptions at Arlington National Cemetery
perpetuated the cover-up.(30) As with McGonagle's citation, Israel
was not mentioned. For fifteen years, the marker over the graves
of six Liberty crewmen read simply, "died in the Eastern
Mediterranean." There was no mention of the ship, the
circumstances, or Israel. Visitors might have concluded that
they died of natural causes. Finally, survivors of the ship
banded together to form the USS Liberty Veterans Association and
launched a protest that produced a modest improvement. The
cover-up was lifted ever so slightly in 1982, when the cemetery
marker was changed to read, "Killed USS Liberty." The dedication
event at grave site was as quiet as the McGonagle ceremony had
been years before. The only civilian official of the U.S.
government attending, Senator Larry Pressler, promised further
investigation of the Liberty episode, but did nothing.
"We get lots of promises," Ennes says, "but no action." He
relates the following example:
Senator Kennedy once promised to look into the issue and
spent a year supposedly reviewing my book and files we
sent. Eventually he wrote to say, "Everything humanly
possible must be done to find the truth about the USS
Liberty." Fine, we said, so conduct an investigation.
You can do that alone as a U.S. senator. He never answered
that or several follow-up letters.
The national cover-up of the event went so far as to dictate
the phrasing of letters of condolence to the survivors of those
killed in the assault. In such circumstances, next of kin
normally receive a letter from the president setting forth the
facts of the tragedy and expressing profound feelings over the
hardship, sacrifice, and bravery involved in the death. In fact,
letters by the hundreds were then being sent to next of kin as
the toll in Vietnam mounted.
To senior White House officials, however, death by Israeli
fire was different from death at the hands of the Vietcong. A
few days after the assault on the Liberty, the senior official
in charge of President Johnson's liaison with the Jewish
community, Harry McPherson, received this message from White
House aide James Cross:
Thirty-one navy personnel were killed aboard the USS
Liberty as the result of the accidental attack by Israeli
forces. The attached condolence letters, which have
been prepared using basic formats approved for Vietnam
War casualties, strike me as inappropriate in this case.
Due to the very sensitive nature of the whole Arab-
Israeli situation and the circumstances under which
these people died, I would ask that you review these
drafts and provide me with nine or ten different
responses which will adequately deal with this special
situation.(31)
The "special situation" led McPherson to agree that many of
the usual paragraphs of condolence were "inappropriate." He
suggested phrases that de-emphasized combat, and that ignored
the Israeli role and even the sacrifice involved. Responding to
the "very sensitive nature" of relations with Israel, the
president's staff set aside time-honored traditions
in recognizing those killed in combat.(32) McPherson suggested
that the letters express the president's gratitude for the
"contribution to the cause of peace" made by the victims and
state that Johnson had tried to avert the Israeli-Arab war.
While Washington engaged in this strange program of
cover-up, Liberty crewmen could remember with satisfaction a
moment of personal pride, however brief.(33) On the afternoon of
June 10, 1967, as the battered ship and its crew prepared to
part company with the USS AMERICA for their journey to Malta and
the Court of Inquiry, Captain Donald Engen ordered a memorial
service for those who had died during the assault. Held on the
deck of the AMERICA, where more than 2,000 sailors were
gathered, the service was an emotional moment. Afterward, as the
ships parted, Engen called for three cheers for the Liberty
crew. Petty Officer Jeffery Carpenter, weakened from loss of
blood, occupied a stretcher on the Liberty's main deck. Crewman
Stan White lifted one end of the stretcher so Carpenter could
see as well as hear the tribute being paid by the carrier. "Such
cheers!" Engen told me. "Boy, you could hear the cheers echo
back and forth across the water. It was a very moving thing."
It was the only "moving thing" that would be officially
bestowed in tribute to the heroic crew.
"THIS IS PURE MURDER"
Books have perpetuated myths about the Liberty. Yitzhak Rabin,
military commander of Israeli forces at the time, declared in
his memoirs, published in 1979, that the Liberty was mistaken
for an Egyptian ship: "I must admit I had mixed feelings about
the news [that it was actually a U.S. ship]--profound regret at
having attacked our friends and a tremendous sense of relief
[that the ship was not Soviet]."(34) He wrote that Israel, while
compensating victims of the assault, refused to pay for the
damage to the ship "since we did not consider ourselves
responsible for the train of errors."
Lyndon Johnson's own memoirs, titled VANTAGE POINT,
continued the fiction that the ship had been "attacked in
error."(35) Although his signature had appeared on letters of
condolence to thirty-four next of kin, his memoirs reported the
death toll at only ten.(36) He cited 100 wounded; the
actual count was 171. He added, "This heartbreaking episode
grieved the Israelis deeply, as it did us." Johnson wrote of the
message he had sent on the hotline to Moscow, in which he
assured the Soviets that carrier aircraft were on their way to
the scene and that "investigation was the sole purpose of these
flights." He did not pretend that protection and rescue of the
ship and its crew were among his objectives, nor did he record
that the carrier aircraft were never permitted to proceed to the
Liberty even for "investigation." The commander in chief devoted
only sixteen lines to one of the worst peacetime naval disasters
in history.
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, identified in a CIA
report as the officer who personally ordered the attack, made no
mention of the Liberty in his lengthy autobiography.(37) According
to the CIA document, Dayan had issued the order over the
protests of another Israeli general who said, "This is pure
murder."
The cover-up also dogged Ennes in the marketing of his book.(38)
Despite high praise in reviews, book orders routinely got
"lost," wholesale listings disappeared mysteriously, and the
Israeli lobby launched a far-flung campaign to discredit the
text. The naval base in San Diego returned a supply of books
when a chaplain filed a complaint. Military writer George Wilson
told Ennes that when the WASHINGTON POST printed a review, "It
seemed that every phone in the building had someone calling to
complain about our mention of the book." The ATLANTA JOURNAL
called Ennes's ASSAULT ON THE Liberty a "disquieting story of
navy bungling, government cover-up and Israeli duplicity that is
well worth reading."(39) The COLUMBUS DISPATCH called it "an inquest
of cover-up in the area of international political intrigue."
Journalist Seymour Hersh praised it as "an insider's book by an
honest participant," and the prestigious Naval Institute at
Annapolis called it "probably the most important naval book of
the year."(40)
Israel took swift measures to warn U.S. readers to ignore
the reviews. The Israeli Foreign Office charged, "Ennes allows
his very evident rancor and subjectivity to override objective
analysis," and that his "conclusions fly in the face of logic
and military facts." These charges, Ennes later said, were
"adopted by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith for
distribution to Israeli supporters throughout the United
States." A caller to the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee was told that the book was "a put-up job, all lies and
financed by the National Association of Arab Americans."(41)
Ennes said the "emotional rhetoric" caused "serious damage to
sales and a marked reluctance of media executives to allow
discussion of this story."
As the result of radio talk shows and lecture platforms on
which Ennes appeared, he heard from people "all over the
country" who had been frustrated in efforts to buy his book.(42)
Several retail book stores, seeking to order the book from the
publisher, Random House, were given false information--they were
told the book did not exist, or that it had not been published,
or that it was out of print, or that it was withdrawn to avoid a
lawsuit.
Talk show host Ray Taliaferro caused a stir one Sunday night
in 1980 when he announced over San Francisco radio station KGO
that he would interview Ennes the following Sunday.(43) More than
500 protest letters poured into the station, but the program
went on as scheduled. Public response was overwhelming, as
listener calls continued to stream in for a full hour after the
two-hour show with Ennes had ended. Two phone calls arrived
threatening Taliaferro's life--one on a supposedly private line.
At the invitation of Paul Backus, editor of the JOURNAL OF
ELECTRONIC DEFENSE, Ennes wrote a guest editorial in 1981 on the
implications of the Liberty incident, stating that friendly
nations sometimes feel compelled to take hostile actions.(44) In
the case of the Liberty, he added:
Because the friendly nation . . . is the nation of Israel,
and because the nation of Israel is widely, passionately,
and expensively supported in the United States, and perhaps
also because a proper inquiry would reveal a humiliating
failure of command, control, and communications, an ade-
quate investigation . . . has yet to be politically
palatable.
Backus was stunned when the owners of the magazine, an
organization of military- and defense-related executives known
as the Association of Old Crows, ordered him not to publish the
Ennes editorial. Association spokesman Gus Slayton wrote to
Backus that the article was "excellent," but said "it would not
be appropriate to publish it now in view of the heightened
tension in the Middle East." Backus, a retired navy officer,
resigned. "I want nothing more to do with organizations which
would further suppress the information," he stated. The Ennes
piece was later given prominent play in a rival magazine,
DEFENSE ELECTRONICS, and the issue became a popular reprint,
selling for three dollars a copy.
As Ennes lectured at universities in the Midwest and West in
1981 and 1982, he encountered protests in different form.
Although most reaction was highly favorable, hecklers called him
a liar and an anti-Semite, and protested to administrators
against his appearance on campus. Posters announcing his
lectures were routinely ripped down. Wording, identical to that
used by the Israeli Foreign Office and B'nai B'rith in their
attacks on the book, appeared in flyers distributed by local
"Jewish student unions" as Ennes spoke to college audiences.
Criticism of Ennes's book seemed to be coordinated on a
national--even international--scale. After National Public Radio
broadcast the full text of the book over its book-reading
network, local Anti-Defamation League spokesmen demanded and
received the opportunity for a tenminute rebuttal at the end of
the series.(45) The rebuttal in Seattle was almost identical to
the wording of a document attacking the book that was issued by
the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem. Both rebuttals matched
verbatim a letter criticizing Ennes that had appeared in the
Jacksonville, Florida, TIMES-UNION.
Ennes's misfortunes took an ironic turn in June 1982 when
ABC'S NIGHTLINE canceled the broadcast of a segment it had
prepared on the fifteen-year reunion of the Liberty crew. The
show was preempted by crisis coverage of Israel's invasion of
Lebanon, which had begun the day before. In early 1983,
NIGHTLINE rescheduled the segment, but once again Israel
intruded, this time when Moshe Arens, Israel's new ambassador to
the United States, took the allotted time. Subsequently, the
edited tape and fifteen reels of unedited film disappeared from
the studio library.
Ennes's book may have cost the former captain of the
ill-fated PUEBLO an appearance on ABC's GOOD MORNING AMERICA
television show in 1980.(46) Bucher was invited to New York for a
post-captivity interview. Suddenly the invitation was withdrawn.
A studio official told Bucher only that he had heard there were
problems "upstairs," but then he asked Bucher, "Did you have a
book review published recently in the WASHINGTON POST?" He had
indeed. The review had heaped praise on Ennes's book.
Later in 1983, the Jewish War Veterans organization
protested when the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) quoted Ennes
to support its call for "proper honors" for those killed on the
Liberty, and again when James R. Currieo, national commander
of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, referred to the "murderous
Israeli attack."(47) Currieo excited Jewish wrath even more
when he published in the VFW magazine a letter to President
Reagan inviting the White House to send a representative to
the cemetery to help honor the men who died. There was no reply.
Twenty-two years after publication of ASSAULT ON THE
Liberty, Ennes is still receiving a steady flow of
correspondence about the episode, particularly through the
book's official Web site at www.ussLiberty.org. Elected by his
shipmates as their official historian, he became editor of THE
USS Liberty NEWSLETTER. Another retired officer, Admiral Thomas
L. Moorer, applauds Ennes's activities and still wants an
investigation.(48) He scoffs at the mistaken identity theory, and
says he hopes Congress will investigate. If it does not, he
favors reopening the navy's Court of Inquiry. He adds, "I would
like to see it done, but I doubt seriously that it will be
allowed."
Asked why the Johnson administration ordered the cover-up,
Moorer is blunt: "The clampdown was not actually for security
reasons but for domestic political reasons. I don't think there
is any question about it. What other reasons could there have
been? President Johnson was worried about the reaction of Jewish
voters." Moorer maintains that the attack was "absolutely
deliberate" and adds, "The American people would be goddamn mad
if they knew what goes on." Indeed: Ennes learned from a U.S.
Air Force intelligence analyst that "the Israelis not only knew
we [on the Liberty] were American but were deeply frustrated and
angry when the Liberty did not sink quickly as intended."(49)
BEYOND ASSAULT
Thirty-five years after the assault, Ennes has written a new
edition of his book and finds glimmers of hope:
Every attempt to hide this story seems to bring more
attention. This past year brought a sixty-minute docu-
mentary, produced by CBS News Productions, that was
broadcast by The History Channel--much to the dismay
and over the heated objections of the Israeli Embassy
and various spokesmen for Israel, who did all in their
power to block it. CAMERA, a leading pro-Israel propa-
ganda arm, produced an extended and angry critique of
the film, accusing survivors and CBS of producing a
"propaganda-laden bogus history" that is deliberately
distorted and anti-Semitic. The History Channel's
report was aired as scheduled and rebroadcast later.
Although CAMERA urged The History Channel not to sell
a video version, it was made available anyway. In
June 2002 London's BBC released anew documentary
called DEAD IN THE WATER. It reveals secret collabor-
ation between Washington and Tel Aviv during the Six-
Day War. A new book, called Operation Cyanide, argues
that carefully laid plans were made to sink the
Liberty, and that the United States was as much to
blame as Israel for what happened.(50)
A number of other authors have also released in-depth
analyses of the crisis and subsequent cover-up. In his Ph.D.
dissertation THE USS Liberty; DISSENTING HISTORY VS. OFFICIAL
HISTORY, John E. Borne painstakingly compares two versions of
the Liberty attack--those of official U.S. history and the
testimony of the Liberty crew--and refutes, point by point, the
erroneous claims of the former, noting also the often
contradictory explanations offered by various Israeli sources.
Most striking to Borne is the extent to which the American
government involved itself in a cover-up of the truth:
Above all, the [Johnson] administration had the power
to silence the crewmen and even to order them to make
statements agreeing with the official version of the
event. The crewmen hoped to somehow attract attention
to their claims, but their hope was in vain. All factors
seemed to combine to silence the crewmen, to make their
story, even if heard, seem unbelievable, and to favor
the administration view of the matter.(51)
Donald Neff's WARRIORS FOR JERUSALEM uses government records
released through the Freedom of Information Act to add
historical detail to the Liberty tragedy. Of the painful
revelations Neff makes, especially tragic is the fact that
Liberty captain McGonagle, upon hearing of the outbreak of
hostilities and well before approaching Israel, requested
protection from the U.S. Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral
William I. Martin. The request was denied, according to Admiral
Martin, because the Liberty was "a clearly marked United States
ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict
and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation."(52) Neff
also mentions the fact that, when U.S. officials were having
second thoughts and decided to order the Liberty away from the
area of fighting, two messages conveying that order were not
delivered.
James Bamford's BODY OF SECRETS also mentions the failed
correspondences, noting that U.S. government inquiries
immediately following the episode "dealt principally with such
topics as the failure of the naval communications system and how
the crew of the ship performed during the crisis. No American
investigators ever looked into the 'why' question or brought the
probe to Israel, the scene of the crime." The details uncovered
by Bamford, induding President Johnson's cover-up in order to
preserve Jewish votes, were simply lying in a box in the back of
the National Security Agency Museum--no one had bothered to
check for them before.(53)
Response to Bamford's book has been varied. Ambassadors and
Middle East experts have spoken with knowledge of the event, one
noting that the evidence Bamford and others have provided is
"strong evidence that this was a deliberate attack." Supporters
of Israel are less forthcoming about the actual event: Thomas
Neumann, executive director of the Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs (JINSA), claimed that--"though I have not
personally read the book"--Bamford's allegations were nonetheless
clearly anti-Semitic.(54)
HE WANTED TO AVOID "HURT FEELINGS"
I occasionally return to Capitol Hill, where I am always on the
lookout for a member of Congress who might be brave enough to
seek hearings, at long last, on the Israeli assault on the USS
Liberty. The surviving crew members richly deserve the official,
public recognition the hearings would bring. Mrs. Findley and I,
both navy veterans, have attended several of their annual
reunions, each a bittersweet experience with neglected military
heroes. A hearing should be conducted while survivors of the
tragedy are still alive to provide details. The cover-up is an
indignity that keeps from the history books a record of rare
heroism.
One day in early 1990 1 stopped to see Charles Bennett of
Florida, who was just starting his twenty-first and final
two-year term in the House of Representatives. Over the years he
had become a congenial symbol of rectitude, dignity, and
diligence, and was much respected by his colleagues. Never fully
recovered from a leg injury during army service in World War II,
he was a familiar sight, scurrying, with the aid of a cane, to
take part in every vote and quorum call. He declined to take
part in congressional study missions, better known as junkets,
because he considered them a waste of taxpayer money.
I believed it a perfect moment to seek Bennett's leadership
for hearings on the Liberty. He was in his final term in
Congress, meaning that Israel's lobby could do him no harm in
the next election; he served as chairman of the seapower
subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services; and he
knew he would never achieve his long-standing ambition to be
chairman of the full committee, as his Democratic colleagues in
the House had recently discarded the seniority system for
choosing committee leadership by elevating Les Aspin to the
chairmanship. This decision passed over several more senior
colleagues, induding Bennett.
I reasoned that Bennett would welcome the responsibility of
chairing hearings that would fully disclose, on public record,
what actually happened to the Liberty and its crew. I was wrong.
He welcomed me to his office with warmth, but when I stated my
mission, he displayed the first anger I had ever observed in
this usually quiet, reserved colleague. He stood and said: "I
won't do it. All the hearings would do is hurt the feelings of
some of my good Jewish friends in my district." He spoke with
such vehemence that I knew the interview was over. I excused
myself, astounded that this highly patriotic colleague with a
long record of loyalty to the armed services would fiercely
reject hearings for navy heroes out of concern for the
embarrassment the truth might cause a few of his constituents.
Their feelings, it seems, rated higher than the pain that the
Liberty survivors have suffered for thirty-five years.
A CALL FOR JUSTICE
Despite the awesome power of Israel's U.S. lobby, Liberty
survivors have a voice in the House of Representatives, thanks
to Democrat Cynthia McKinney, Georgia's first African American
congresswoman. Long a supporter of civil and human rights, she
was the only member of Congress to attend a massive rally held
April 20, 2002, on Washingtons National Mall to express
solidarity with the Palestinian people. Two months later, she
introduced the following speech into the Congressional Record, a
fitting testimonial to the determination of the Liberty crew:
Mr. Speaker, I speak to commemorate and recognize the
tragic attack that took place against the USS Liberty
on June 8, 1967. Although thirty-five years have come
and gone since this historic event, the survivors of
the USS Liberty are still struggling with the fact that
their story has never been heard. While there has never
been an official investigation into this event, we have
learned from survivor accounts that for over seventy-
five minutes the Israeli defense forces attacked the
USS Liberty, killing 34 American soldiers and wounding
an additional 171. With over 85 percent of the crew
either dead or wounded, they somehow managed to keep
the ship afloat after being hit by over a thousand
rounds of rocket, cannon, machine gun, napalm hits,
and even a direct hit from a torpedo. This unprovoked
attack took place in international waters, and by a
trusted ally. The only explanation given to the survivors
and their families as to why this attack took place was
that it was an accident and that their ship was not
identified as being American, regardless of the fact
that our flag was proudly flown throughout the attack.
Unfortunately, that explanation is not good enough for
those whose lives have been impacted by this attack,
and it should not be good enough for the American people.
Let's not wait another thirty-five years before we
provide the survivors an official investigation into why
this attack took place and allow them to tell their story.
We owe them more than a debt of gratitude for their
sacrifice; we owe them the truth.
The navy's official Court of Inquiry was a sham. Both the
admiral who headed the inquiry and his legal counsel knew it was
phony. In retirement, U.S. Navy Captain Ward Boston, who served
as court counsel, admitted that they privately disputed the
court's official conclusion that the assault was a case of
mistaken identity. Boston told a reporter for the NAVY TIMES
that both he and Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, who served as
president of the court, privately agreed that the Israeli forces
knew they were attacking a U.S. Navy ship. In explaining why he
participated in the sham, Boston said, "In military life, you
accept the fact that if you're told to shut up, you shut up. We
did what we were told." Former CIA director Richard Helms said,
"It was no accident."(55)
It is a pity that Senator John McCain, a prisoner-of-war
survivor and an authentic hero of the U.S. Navy during the
Vietnam War, was duped into publicly endorsing the phony
findings of the Court of Inquiry. After reading THE Liberty
INCIDENT, the latest attempt to cover up Israel's perfidy,
written by a former navy pilot who is a federal judge, McCain
wrote: "After years of research for this book, Judge A. Jay
Cristol has reached a similar conclusion to one my father [then
chief of Naval Operations] reached in his June 18, 1967,
endorsement of the findings of the Court of Inquiry. I commend
Judge Cristol for his thoroughness and fairness, and I commend
this work."(56)
The episode leaves one wondering if someone ordered the
federal judge to write the book-length whitewash of the Court of
Inquiry whitewash.
NOTES
(1) Moorer
(2) James M. Ennes, Jr., ASSAULT ON THE Liberty
(3) NEW YORK TIMES, June 8, 1967.
(4) U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1978.
(5) Admiral Donald Engen, interview, August 29, 1983.
(6) Ennes, op. cit.
(7) NEW YORK TIMES, June 10, 1967.
(8) WASHINGTON STAR, June 16, 1967.
(9) U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, June 26, 1967;
DEFENSE ELECTRONICS, October 1981.
(10) NEW YORK TIMES, June 18, 1967.
(11) Admiral Isaac Kidd, interview, October 7, 1963.
(12) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),
news release, June 28, 1967.
(13) Ennes.
(14) NEW YORK TIMES, June 29, 1967;
WASHINGTON POSE, June 30, 1967.
(15) NEW YORK TIMES, July 1, 1967.
(16) WASHINGTON STAR, June 30, 1967.
(17) NEW YORK TIMES, July 7, 1967.
(18) Ennes, interview, April 30, 1983.
(19) Ennes, ASSAULT ON THE Liberty
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) NATIONAL REVIEW, September 5, 1967.
(23) Ennes, interview, April 30, 1983.
(24) Defense Electronics, October 1981.
(25) Commander Lloyd N. Bucher, interview, April 10, 1983.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Moorer.
(28) Ennes, ASSAULT ON THE Liberty;
PACIFIC NORTHWEST, September 1982.
(29) CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 22, 1982.
(30) USS Liberty NEWSLETTER, December 1982.
(31) White House memorandum from James U. Cross to
Harry McPherson, June 20, 1967.
(32) White House memorandum from Harry McPherson to
James U. Cross.
(33) Engen, August 29, 1983.
(34) Yitzak Rabin, RABIN MEMOIRS.
(35) President Lyndon Johnson, VANTAGE POINT.
(36) These understated numbers reflect estimates that appeared in
some newspapers before the full casualty count was known;
NEW YORK TIMES, June 9, 1967.
(37) Moshe Dayan, STORY OF MY LIFE.
(38) WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1982; Ennes, interview, August I0, 1982.
(39) Ennes, ASSAULT ON THE Liberty.
(40) Letter from Seymour Hersh to Robert Loomis of Random House, 1979.
(41) Ennes, interview, April 30, 1983.
(42) MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVE, June 1981.
(43) Ennes.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Bucher.
(47) JEWISH VETERANS, April/May/June 1983.
(48) Moorer.
(49) Ennes, "The USS Liberty Still Covered Up After 35 Years,"
WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, June/July 2002.
(50) Ibid.
(51) John E. Borne, "The USS Liberty: Dissenting History vs. Official
History (Reconsideration Press, 1996).
(52) Neff, "Warriors for Jerusalem."
(53) James Bamford, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (New York: Doubleday Press, 2001).
(54) Suzy Hansen, "The Assault on the USS Liberty," www.salon.com.
(55) Bryant Jordan, "Key Investigators Express Belief That Israel
Deliberately Attacked U.S. Ship," Navy Times, June 26, 2002.
(56) E-mail from James Ennes, July 2, 2002.
| |
|