

I believe that we have a commitment to provide the full amount of funds authorized by Public Laws 815 and 874. I ask now that we live up to that commitment!

Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

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#### ATTACK ON U.S.S. "LIBERTY": ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR?

Mr. RARICK (at the request of Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, one of the most amazing aspects of the recent Israeli-Arab war was the unprovoked attack on June 8, 1967, in international waters of the Mediterranean by Israeli forces on the U.S.S. *Liberty*, as the result of which the vessel was seriously damaged, 34 of the ship's company died and another 75 were wounded.

Still more strange is the way the story of this unprecedented assault, after the initial flurry, has been hushed up in the mass news media of the United States.

Notwithstanding the silence that has overtaken this assault, enough information about it has filtered through smaller publications on which to form conclusions.

The incident is recognized as adding new glory to the traditions of our gallant Navy comparable to the battle between H.M.S. *Shannon* and the U.S.S. *Chesapeake* on June 1, 1813, when the immortal words of the dying Capt. James Lawrence of the U.S.S. *Chesapeake* were uttered: "Don't give up the ship!"

The conduct of the commanding officer of the *Liberty* during the attack, Comdr. William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy, his officers and crew, were truly heroic, measuring up to the highest traditions of the naval service. It is, indeed, fortunate that Commander McGonagle was an able, energetic officer who had kept his crew well trained for such emergency.

The more the case is studied the more questions occur. Who planned the attack on the *Liberty*, and why was it made? Why has the report of the naval court of inquiry not been made public? In the event of the sinking of the *Liberty*, would not the blame have been placed on Egypt, just as the sinking of the *Maine* in 1898 in Havana Harbor was placed on Spain, which, historians tell us, did not wish war with the United States?

Mr. Speaker, I submit that the attack on the *Liberty* warrants a full and complete investigation by the Congress, as recommended by the American Legion at its 1967 Convention. This should be done promptly to avoid another such incident that could be made to serve as a Pearl Harbor for world war III.

Two articles bringing together many facts and the 1967 resolution of the American Legion on the *Liberty* incident follow:

[From the National Review, Sept. 5, 1967]

JUNE 8, AT 1400 HOURS

(By James Jackson Kilpatrick)

The USS *Liberty*, a communications vessel attached to the Sixth Fleet, took on fuel and provisions at Rota, Spain, on June 2, 1967. She left that same day, under orders to proceed at top speed to an assigned position off the Sinai coast 800 miles to the east. She carried a crew of fifteen officers and 279 men. Three civilians identified cryptically as "technical representatives" from the Department of Defense (DOD), also were aboard. She arrived on station early on the morning of Thursday, the 8th. It was the fourth day of the six-day war between Israel and the Arab nations. That afternoon the *Liberty* was to undergo an attack without precedent in modern naval history. Thirty-four men would die, among them one of the DOD technicians; another 75 would be wounded. Well over a third of her total company would be casualties of an unprovoked assault in an undeclared war, victims of an inexplicable "mistake" on the Israelis' part. Or so the incident is described.

What follows here is neither an exposé of the *Liberty*'s clandestine role in the Mediterranean nor an explanation of the Israelis' trigger-happy attack; these aspects of the affair are at present unknowable. What follows is no more than an account, drawn largely from official records, of what happened. This is, in brief, a sea story; nothing more. Yet sea stories always are worth the spinning, and the story of the *Liberty*, that blazing summer afternoon, speaks of enduring values that men too often forget: loyalty, and discipline, and courage under fire.

As she chugged eastward across the Mediterranean, the *Liberty* surely was no thing of remarkable beauty. She had started her maritime life as a freighter of the old Victory class, her keel laid down in Portland, Oregon, late in February 1945. These were the days of Rosie the Riveter; merchant ships were not long in gestation. This product of the assembly line was delivered to the Maritime Commission a little more than two months later. During the closing months of World War II and for some years thereafter, she plied the Pacific Far East. She saw considerable service during the Korean conflict. In 1958, an old tub, she went into the Reserve Fleet, mothballed in Puget Sound, there to slumber for nearly five years.

#### OUT OF MOTHBALLS

Meanwhile, the Navy embarked upon a program of developing special communications ships. Three old *Liberty* freighters came out of mothballs, to emerge on the East Coast as *Oxford*, *Georgetown* and *Jamestown*. In the summer of 1963, two additional conversions were ordered from the aging Victories on the West Coast. The former *Iran Victory* returned to service in November of 1964 as the *Belmont*; and on December 30, 1964, the former SS *Simmons Victory* went back to sea as the USS *Liberty*. By general acknowledgment, the five vessels make up our own fleet of "Russian travelers." In the short word, they are spy ships.

We pick her up in early June: 455 feet long, 62 feet at the beam, her topside exhibiting a puzzling collection of masts and antennae, a "Big Ear" turning inquisitively

amidships, assigned to the Sixth Fleet, in the Mediterranean. Down below, in the forward compartments, walled off from the operating crew, were the communications technicians. And with them, by general report, were specialists not merely from DOD, but more precisely from the super-secret National Security Agency. Among them, it is said, were experts in code-cracking and cryptographic machinery. One can only guess at the devices the *Liberty* had aboard for receiving, recording, transmitting. It is known that the Big Ear could pick up messages from a hundred miles away. And now, with war briefly raging between Israel and the Arab nations, the Big Ear was ordered to listen off Sinai.

In April of 1966, Commander William Loren McGonagle, USN, had assumed command of *Liberty*. Born in Kansas, he had been raised in Coachella, California. He was graduated in 1947 from the University of Southern California at Los Angeles, an ensign in the V-12 program. He served for nearly three years on a radar picket destroyer, then as executive officer on the minesweeper *Kite* on combat patrol off Korea. Tours of duty followed at San Francisco and Bremerhaven and Philadelphia; he was back at sea for two years on the heavy cruiser *Rochester*; then came his first command on *Mataco*, an ocean-going tug. He returned to shore for special training at the University of Idaho; spent two more years at sea, commanding the salvage vessel *Reclaimer*; then put in another two years of staff operations in the Pacific. Finally came his assignment to *Liberty*.

#### WHERE WERE THE ORDERS?

Now, none of this experience, it will be seen, had prepared McGonagle precisely for what was to happen on the afternoon of June 8. To be sure, he had known hazardous duty on *Kite*, and he had put in some anxious moments picking up mines in the Baltic in 1952. On the record, however, one may surmise that he had never heard a shot in anger. We meet him, this summer day, at age 41, a professional naval officer, doing the same job he had been doing for fourteen months.

So he brought the *Liberty* to her assigned position early on the morning of June 8, a hot day, the sun bright, the sea calm. His orders were to maintain patrol from "a point thirteen nautical miles from the coast of the United Arab Republic at 31-27.2N and 34-00E (point Alpha), thence to 31-22.3N and 33-42E (point Bravo), thence to 31-31N and 33-00E (point Charlie), retracing this track until new orders might be received." As events were to turn out, some new orders were in fact dispatched that very morning, but these messages strangely were "misrouted, delayed, and not timely received."

*Liberty* steamed methodically along her southeastern course until she reached point Alpha at 8:49. The ship's normal American ensign, a flag 5 x 8 feet, fluttered loosely in the torpid air. Then she turned to the south-western leg. At about that moment, an unidentified jet aircraft approached and circled the ship. This was at 8:50 by the log. Some forty minutes later, the tall minaret at El Arish became visible, thirteen miles away. McGonagle asked for a bearing on the minaret, in order to make certain of his position within the established operating area. Everything checked out nicely. An hour later, at 10:26, with the *Liberty* nudging along at five knots, two unidentified aircraft again orbited the ship. The presumption is strong—indeed, the presumption is inescapable—that these were Israeli reconnaissance planes. They circled the ship three times at a distance of approximately two miles. At 10:56, another aerial visitor turned up—"an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar," which passed astern at a distance of three to five miles. "The plane circled the ship around the starboard side, proceeded for-

ward of the ship, and headed back toward the Sinai peninsula." Visibility was perfect.

#### THE UNMARKED PLANE

"This aircraft," McGonagle was to testify at the Navy Court of Inquiry, "continued to return in a somewhat similar fashion approximately at thirty-minute intervals. It was not possible to see any markings on the aircraft, and the identity of this aircraft remains unknown."

McGonagle was not greatly worried by the surveillance. He was clearly within international waters, by anyone's international law. At 11:32, passing point Bravo, he altered course to 283 true, and plodded along his westward leg. During the morning, he was approached by the engineering officer, Lieutenant George Golden, asking permission to let the number two boiler cool for gasket repairs. The permission was granted, and the boiler began to cool at noon.

At 1:10, the ship went to general quarters for a routine non-competitive drill in chemical attack procedures. Just as the 38-minute drill began, a billowing cloud of black smoke arose from the Sinai beach, some fifteen to twenty miles west of El Arish. The drill went off satisfactorily, but McGonagle saw an opportunity to put in a timely word. Every naval officer knows the problem of maintaining interest in damage control drills; other shipboard exercises can be usefully simulated, but drills in damage control have a way of demanding more imagination than sailors ordinarily can muster.

From the transcript:

"Before dismissing the crew from general drills, I gave the crew a short talk on the PA system, reminding them of the importance of expeditiously responding to general quarters . . . in the event of an actual attack. So that they would be impressed, I pointed out to the crew at that time that the column of black smoke should be sufficient evidence that the ship was in a potentially dangerous location. I had no evidence or indication that an attack would actually be made on the ship."

Ordinarily, as McGonagle would recall, it was his practice after a drill to join the officers for a cup of coffee in the wardroom, in order to go over the performance with an eye to improvement. This time, he was generally pleased with the exercise. His ship was secure; morale was high; some of his off-duty sailors were about to take sunbaths. He lingered on the bridge, chatting casually with his executive officer, Lieutenant Commander Philip McCutcheon Armstrong Jr. A few other officers were there—Lieutenant Maurice H. Bennett of Pittsburgh, Lieutenant James M. Ennis Jr. of Norfolk, and Lieutenant Stephen Spencer North, the son of retired naval Captain Joseph C. Toth of Virginia Beach. Lieutenant James G. O'Connor, who had served as officer of the deck during the general quarters drill, was ready to go off duty for lunch. Lieutenant (j.g.) Lloyd Clyde Painter climbed up the ladder to replace him.

For no particular reason, except that such reasons always stir in a naval captain's head, McGonagle put his own eyes to the radar screen for one more bearing on the minaret at El Arish. The landmark was then 25.5 miles distant; the bearing was 142, comfortably within the bearing he had established earlier as a danger point against shoal waters. It was 1:55. Painter had officially relieved O'Connor as officer of the deck. Ensign Malcolm Pat O'Malley of Minneapolis had just assumed the conn. McGonagle was ready to go below. Still he lingered.

At 2 o'clock, lookouts just above the bridge reported jet aircraft approaching. McGonagle moved to the starboard wing of the bridge to have a look at them with binoculars. He was able to observe one aircraft "of similar characteristics, if not identical, to the two aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day." The plane was about five or six

miles away, at an altitude of perhaps 7,000 feet. It appeared to be traveling on a parallel course with the ship. There was no evidence of a hostile attitude. McGonagle put down the binoculars and again turned away.

The first explosion came, as best he can recall, within a couple of minutes. He sounded a general alarm, and dashed to the port wing of the bridge. Two 55-gallon gasoline drums, stored amidships on the main deck, were burning furiously. The outside port ladders were blocked. He ordered Armstrong to go down the starboard side and get the drums pushed overboard. O'Connor, who also had lingered on the bridge, moved to go with him. The two men had just reached the top of the starboard ladder, when a second bomb struck, this one near a whaleboat stowed just aft of the bridge. The explosion killed Armstrong outright and flung the others back into the crowded room. Suddenly the whole of the tidy bridge was a mass of blood and debris.

#### "ALL AHEAD FLANK!"

McGonagle grabbed for the engine order annunciator, remembering to his dismay that the number two boiler was cooling. He desperately rang up all ahead flank. To his vast relief, smoke belched from the stack, and the wounded *Liberty* seemed to pick up speed. He ordered a message sent by the high command radio to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising that *Liberty* was under attack. He glanced at the helm and saw that his helmsman had been seriously injured by the second bomb blast. Quartermaster Third Class Francis Brown, of Troy, N.Y., had leaped to the helm in his place. In less than half an hour, Brown himself was to die.

The strafing attack continued. Whether there were two planes or three, McGonagle cannot recall. They came over the *Liberty* in criss-cross runs a minute or so apart, punishing the ship with machine guns, rockets, and fragmentation bombs. After the first or second run, McGonagle reached for a phone to relay some command, but the phone circuits had been destroyed. The public address system went out. Shouting through the smoke, he saw that Ensign John D. Scott of Charlotte, N.C. was rallying damage control parties to fight a raging fire in the vicinity of the whaleboat. Ensign David G. Lucas managed to make his way to the bridge, stepping over the bodies of the dead and wounded men. Together, they assigned runners to relay orders to the repair parties and to other vital stations.

It may have been on the third run that McGonagle himself was hit. He could not recall pain or even shock. He looked down, and saw his right leg turning red. At the subsequent Navy Court of Inquiry, he was asked about the wound. He testified during his first appearance on the witness stand:

"I was knocked off my feet; I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence. I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers right leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries."

The hostile planes kept boring in. A moment or so later, Ensign Lucas staggered in painful surprise: He had taken a piece of shrapnel in his forehead. McGonagle opened the bridge safe, got out a camera, and struggled to the port wing in order to take pictures of the attackers. For the remainder of the assault, he kept the camera close at hand.

It was now about 2:20. The *Liberty* was still on her course of 283 true, plodding toward point Charlie. She was still moving along at something in excess of five knots. The attacking planes abruptly wheeled off. Through the smoke, McGonagle caught a glimpse of three high-speed torpedo boats

approaching from the northeast at 27 to thirty knots.

From the transcript:

"It appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude, and since I did not have direct communication with gun control or the gun mounts, I told a man from the bridge, whose identity I do not recall, to proceed to mount 51 and take the boats under fire. The boats continued to approach the ship at high speed and on a constant bearing with decreasing range."

"About this time, I noticed that our ensign had been shot away during the air attack, and ordered Signalman [Russell O'Neal] David to hoist the largest ensign we had in the locker. He ran up the holiday ensign [7 x 13 feet]. It was flying before the boats attacked."

Old menaces stormed back to McGonagle's mind. If he turned the *Liberty* to port, in order to avoid the torpedo boats, he risked the coastal shoals. If he turned to starboard, he gave his pursuers an even better target. He stayed on course and prayed for Golden's boilers to give him maximum speed.

From the transcript:

"When the boats reached an approximate range of 2,000 yards, the center boat of the formation was signaling to us. Also, at this range, it appeared that they were flying an Israeli flag. This was later verified. It was not possible to read the signals from the center torpedo boat because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. At this time I yelled to machine gun 51 to hold fire. I realized that there was a possibility of the air attack having been conducted in error. I wanted to hold fire to see if we could read the signal from the torpedo boat and perhaps avoid additional damage and personnel injuries. The man on machine gun 51 fired a short burst at the boat before he was able to understand what I was attempting to have him do."

Then, to McGonagle's consternation, he saw that one of the aft machine guns, gun 53, had erupted into extremely effective action. "It's Quintero," he said to Ensign Lucas. "He's blanketing that boat. Go around the port skylight and tell him to hold fire." Lucas clambered off, but later would testify that it wasn't Boatswain's Mate Anthony A. Quintero at all.

From the transcript of Lucas's testimony:

"The first thing I noticed was that the mount 54 [on the port side] was vacant. Flames had reached it and chased everyone out of there. I ran toward the gun mount, and looked over the skylight from the engineering spaces. I had a clear view of mount 53 [the starboard mount, which was firing] from, say, the waist up, and there was no one on mount 53. The flames from the motor whaleboat were coming over the lip of the mount. I assume that the bullets that were in the gun, or bullets that were in the ready service ammunition box, very near there, were cooking off and firing."

At 2:34, the torpedo boats opened fire with their own guns. A cannon shot caught Quartermaster Brown. Mortally wounded, he fell from the helm. Seconds later, three torpedoes sped toward the *Liberty*. One passed astern by 25 yards. A second may have passed beneath the ship. The third struck the *Liberty* forward, on her starboard side, immediately below the waterline. In the instant of the explosion, 25 men died—most of them highly skilled technicians. The ship went dead in the water, her steering control and all power lost. But there was no additional fire, and a nine-degree list to starboard presented no immediate danger of sinking. McGonagle's weary brain began to recalculate the shoal waters, with the thought of grounding his ship if he had to.

#### "GO TO HELL!"

It was 2:40. In the midst of this bizarre nighttime, is seemed not at all surprising that the commanding torpedo boat made a

swift turn, stopped dead some 500 yards astern, and began signaling in English: "Do you require assistance?" McGonagle had no light left to return the signal. He ordered the flags "Lima India" hoisted, signifying that "I am not under control." (Somewhat later an Israeli sailor was to say that "an officer appeared and shouted 'go to hell!'") After a moment or two—long enough for McGonagle to attempt a photograph of the vessel—the torpedo boat moved away from shore. Two minutes later, two helicopters, bearing Star of David markings, appeared. They hovered about the smoking ship, circled her repeatedly, flew off for about five miles, returned once more, and vanished.

McGonagle's mind turned to the dead, the wounded, the problems of regaining steering. Scott's damage control parties were working at fever pitch, the sailors stripped to the waist, the deck a mass of twisted metal and burning gear. But the watertight bulkheads were holding, the starboard list was no worse, and Lieutenant Richard H. Klepfer of Brooklyn, a Navy doctor, had done a superb job of organizing a main battle dressing station in the mess hall. Most of the slain men were trapped in the forward compartments, but three or four mutilated bodies, streaming blood, were still on deck. They were in plain view of the inspecting helicopters. By this time, McGonagle's wounded leg was giving increasing pain. He stretched out and tried to keep the limb elevated. Then, to his horror, he looked up: The two jets were coming back from the starboard side, "in initial fashion to that which preceded the initial attack." He called an alert to the possibility of renewed assault, but the jets disappeared.

It was 4:15. McGonagle ordered the ship's international call sign hoisted, and turned again to the problems of getting the *Liberty* back under steam. Both boilers came briefly back on the line, but lost their fuel oil suction almost at once. The gyro compass was a wreck. It was impossible to learn the ship's heading. The ship's surviving communications technicians, however, were able to manage the impossible: They rigged some emergency radio-telephone circuits, and restored communications with the Sixth Fleet.

McGonagle leaned against a bulkhead. The whole bridge spun around him. He slumped to the deck, giddy from loss of blood. A communications technician, Jeffrey Robert Carpenter of Norfolk, cut away his right trousers leg and applied a tourniquet. McGonagle refused to give up the conn he had assumed at 2 o'clock; he was to retain the conn until 6:30 the following morning.

A thousand demands cried for his attention. Some of the crew members had dropped life rafts. McGonagle sent a messenger to tell them to leave the lifeboats alone. The boats weren't needed now, but they might be needed later. He sent a message to Fleet Command, detailing the estimated dead and casualties. Friendly fighters from the carrier *America* were around him. Back in Washington, President Johnson had been on the hot line to Moscow, advising Premier Kosygin of the situation. The international uproar was beginning. McGonagle's principal concern was to keep the *Liberty* moving. The engine room, thank God and George Golden's crew, managed to get the boilers going again. To his delight, the ship turned up a brisk eight knots. McGonagle ordered a course estimated at 340 magnetic, and arranged for emergency manual steering.

From the transcript:

"The amount of rudder was given to after steering over emergency-rigged sound-powered telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the ship's heading most of the time."

The azimuth of the setting sun provided a rough guide to help the *Liberty* along. The fathometer was still working: It reported 26 fathoms under the keel—plenty of water for the moment, but the shoals were somewhere near at hand and it was only a guess whether the magnetic compass had been knocked awry. McGonagle toyed with the idea of dropping anchor, and even directed Lucas to get up an anchor party and go to the fore-castle. His thought was to wait until it got dark, then take a visual bearing on the North Star, because "once I was able to sight the North Star, I would know in which direction the ship was actually proceeding." Then another thought prevailed: He ordered the engines backed two-thirds, and for eighteen minutes the *Liberty* backed carefully away from the threatening shallows.

"How much water?" he kept asking. When the fathometer got to 48, he drew a long breath and ordered the rudder around to a bearing of 025 magnetic. The engineers produced power, though the lube oil pressure kept giving trouble. By 6 o'clock, *Liberty* was moving at a creditable ten knots, with 82 fathoms under her keel.

At 6:45, a lookout sent word to the bridge that another Israeli helicopter was approaching.

"What do they want?" asked McGonagle. "Sir, they're trying to land a man aboard."

McGonagle was in no mood for social visitors or for boarding parties. He thought of the dangerous clutter on the fore-castle, and ordered a wave-off. The helicopter then dropped a message to the deck. Written on the back of the calling card of Commander Ernest Carl Castle, Naval Attaché for Air, U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, it read: "Have you casualties?"

From the transcript:

"We attempted to advise them by flashing light with an Aldis lamp that 'affirmative,' we did have casualties. I'm not sure that wounded men were still lying around the deck, as such. By that time, most of our wounded had been taken to the casualty collection stations."

"COUNSEL FOR THE COURT. In amplification of the Admiral's question, was there not a considerable amount of blood on the decks that would be obvious from a reasonable distance?"

"THE WITNESS. That is correct. There were numerous blood streams the full length from the fore-castle to the main deck at machine gun mount 51, where one body was still lying. I do recall that now. There was also another body in the vicinity of mount 51."

After ten or fifteen minutes of unsuccessful attempts at communication, the helicopter buzzed off. And darkness fell.

In a Navy that delights in tales of seamanship, men will be talking for years of the night that McGonagle brought the *Liberty* back from Sinai. At the Court of Inquiry's hearings, McGonagle was recalled to the stand.

From the transcript:

"COUNSEL FOR THE COURT. I have no further questions. Does any member of the Court desire to question the witness?"

"THE PRESIDENT. Captain McGonagle, in our previous discussion, you told me a story which I have since come to identify as remarkable humility and self-effacement on your part, which I presume had caused you not to mention in testimony the way you navigated this ship out of dangerous waters after the attack. Will you please tell the Court how, while lying on your back, with no compass except the magnetic compass, and based upon your recollection of the magnetic compass error in relation to the gyro compass book, you used the sun and subsequently the North Star to clear the area?"

"THE WITNESS. Admiral, after a time on the bridge, when I had received minor injuries, I lost considerable blood, and when attempts to stop the flow of blood by self-

help were unsuccessful, I noticed myself beginning to lose consciousness. I immediately lay down flat on my back on the port wing, and raised the bleeding leg as high as possible, resting it on my port bridge chair, and there a first class communications technician by the name of Carpenter and other persons whom I don't recall at this time, applied a tourniquet to my right leg which effectively stopped the flow of blood. I at no time lost consciousness and had my full faculties at all times.

"I realized at that time I had lost considerable amounts of blood because it was sloshing in my shoes. . . . But since the flow of blood had stopped, I gave no further consideration to—I didn't consider I had any more problem in that area."

"I conned the ship by looking aft, and by being able to see the wake of the ship I was able to tell after steering which way to apply the rudder and how long to leave it on to attempt to average out the course that I felt the ship should travel to stand clear of possible shoal areas. I remained on my back for approximately an hour and a half. I then felt that I had regained sufficient strength that I was able to get up from the deck and conn the ship from the wing of the ship and from the pilot house. . . . It seemed to me that my remaining on the bridge—this would be able to lessen the shock that the rest of the crew had received."

The Navy doctor, Lieutenant Klepfer, saw McGonagle during the evening but made no effort to get him below to a battle dressing station. "The Commanding Officer at that time was like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves," he told the court. "To know that he was on the bridge grievously wounded, yet having the conn and the helm through the night calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men 'we're going to live.' When I came to the bridge and saw this, I knew that I could only ineffectually suggest that he be taken below for treatment of his wounds. I didn't even suggest it."

Dr. Klepfer's own performance was in the highest naval tradition. He performed one major operation immediately after the engagement. He and his two hospital corpsmen stayed on duty for 28 hours.

From the transcript of Dr. Klepfer's testimony:

"Any time we needed one volunteer, we'd get ten. If anything had to be done, there were hands everywhere. When asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, we had people on the adjoining tables who were saying, 'If you need some, I have this type.' These were people already wounded."

During the night, McGonagle ordered three musters to identify the dead. He and his remaining officers bent to the task of preparing casualty messages. He winced at the first of these, to Mrs. Philip McC. Armstrong Jr., of 433 West Main Street, Dalton, Pennsylvania. His executive officer, a 38-year-old graduate of the Naval Academy, had left a young widow and five children behind. Lieutenant James C. Pierce had died, and Lieutenant Stephen Toth. The list included Allen M. Blue, one of the DOD specialists. And the sailors: Allenbaugh, Blanchard, Brown (he would recommend Brown for posthumous commendation), Campbell, Converse, Eisenberg, Goss, Graves, Hayden, Hersey, Higgins, Hoar, Keene, Lenau, Linn, Lupton, Margraf, Marlborough, Mendle, Nygren, Raper, Rehmeier, Skolak, John C. Smith and Melvid D. Smith, Spicher, Thompson, Thornton, Tiedtke, Walton. . . . Most of them were naval communications technicians, stationed in the forward compartments, who died in the torpedo's explosion.

Early on the morning of June 9, a lookout sent word that the U.S. destroyer *Davis* was in sight, ready for escort duty. Helicopters arrived from the carrier *America*, to transfer the wounded. During the morning, the

fleet tug *Papago* also arrived. The heavy cruiser *Little Rock* joined the parade. The little convoy moved slowly off to Malta. The *Liberty* still listing badly and 26 bodies still entombed in the flooded wreckage of the communications rooms. She arrived at Veletta on the 14th. Aired workers in the shipyard counted 821 separate hits upon the hull and superstructure by bombs, rockets, and machine gun bullets. The teardrop hole left by the torpedo explosion measured 39 feet across.

## II

A Navy Court of Inquiry opened its hearings in London on June 11, and continued them aboard the *Liberty* at Malta through June 17. Admiral I. C. Kidd served as President of the Court; other members were Captains Bernard J. Lauff and Bert M. Atkinson, both attached to headquarters of Admiral John S. McCain Jr., commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Almost all of the testimony taken by the court remains in classified status. Some excerpts have been released from McGonagle's transcript. A few quotations from the evidence supplied by Ensign Lucas and Dr. Klepper also have been made public. No supporting material whatever, having to do either with *Liberty's* mission or with the Israeli "mistake," has been released. For the time being, there is no way for the outside observer to form an independent judgment, from the record, upon the Court's conclusions.

We are told that the Court determined that "USS *Liberty* was in international waters, properly marked as to her identity and nationality," at the time the attack occurred. The Court produced evidence "that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify *Liberty* correctly," but the Court "had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack."

These reasons must remain a matter of speculation. There is some evidence, wholly apart from considerations of diplomacy and logic, to sustain the position taken by the Israeli government, that the attack was a tragic mistake. On a windless day, the ensign first hoisted by *Liberty* may well have been drooping unrecognizably from the mast. The second, "holiday" ensign, hoisted just before the torpedo attack, may indeed have been obscured by the smoke. This was the explanation advanced by Micha Limor, an Israeli Naval reservist, in an article written for the Associated Press on July 6. Limor was aboard one of the three torpedo boats.

"About 2,000 yards from the ship," he wrote, "the high masts and many weird antennae showed that this was a warship. The side of the vessel was blotted out by smoke, and apart from three numbers along her side, we could not discern a thing. We could see no flag on the mast, nor was anyone to be seen on the decks and bridge."

## THE NAGGING QUESTION

By Limor's account, the Israeli torpedo boats attempted repeatedly to get some identification from the *Liberty*, but received no response to their signals. Then "a sailor started firing at us with a heavy machine gun from the bridge," and "thus there was no doubt that we were faced by the enemy." It was not until after the torpedo struck home that one of the Israeli boats picked up an object from the sea and saw that it was a rubber lifeboat bearing the name of the U.S. Navy.

Another line of speculation, apart from Limor's generally corroborating statement, was advanced by the Navy Court of Inquiry in an appendix to its report. Here the Court noted that *Liberty* "might have been mistaken for the Egyptian supply ship *El Quseir*." But the Court went on to say that *El Quseir* bears only a "highly superficial resemblance" to *Liberty*. The Egyptian ship is

less than half the size of the American vessel; its superstructure is entirely different; and of course it has none of the elaborate antennae and distinctive radar devices that instantly identify the *Liberty*.

In a statement on June 10, the Pentagon coldly rejected published reports that some unidentified Pentagon spokesmen believed that "a plausible explanation" could be found in human error. Assistant Secretary for Defense Phil G. Goulding said that "we in the department cannot accept an attack upon a clearly marked noncombatant U.S. naval ship in international waters as 'plausible' under any circumstances whatsoever. The suggestion that the United States flag was not visible and the implication that the identification markings were in any way inadequate are both unrealistic and inaccurate. The identification markings of U.S. naval vessels have proven satisfactory for international recognition for nearly 200 years."

During the past month, press service interviews with survivors of the attack have turned up a uniform conviction that the attack was deliberate. Sailors point to the morning-long aerial surveillance; the presence of the flag; the known configuration of the *Liberty*; her name in English on the stern (Egyptian naval ships carry their names in the curative Arabic script); her slow progression in international waters. All these factors support the crew's conclusion that the assault was no accident.

Opposed to this argument is the line of reasoning which holds that the Israeli government was heavily dependent upon the goodwill of the United States; that it would have been utterly irrational for the Israeli navy knowingly to have launched an attack on a U.S. ship; and that the only reasonable explanation is that the incident was a mistake arising from the natural tensions and fallible judgments of a hot war.

So, too, does the mystery of what happened to the orders sent to McGonagle "early on the morning of June 8." All that we are told of these messages—in the plural—is that 1) the orders came directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 2) the orders were "to move farther from the coast," and 3) the orders were "misrouted, delayed, and not received until after the attack."

No communications system is infallible. Humans make errors; the ionosphere plays tricks; power goes off at critical moments; even carriers operating off Vietnam have significant blackout periods when they can neither send nor receive. Granted.

When these possibilities have been given full account, the bare statement that the orders were "misrouted and delayed" remains incredible. One would like to know a great deal more about these "misrouted and delayed" messages. Did they exist? What precisely did they say? Who saw them? When? Where? How did they go astray?

One would also like to know a great deal more, of course, about the specific purpose sought to be served by *Liberty's* position so close to the Sinai shore. Why thirteen miles out? Or twelve, or fifteen, or whatever it was? Again, the Pentagon's statements strain credulity. The first explanation, recalling that inspirational moment when the downed U-2 was only a missing weather plane, was that *Liberty* had to be close to shore in order to use the moon for message relays. The second explanation was that *Liberty's* only job was "to assure communication between U.S. Government posts in the Mideast and to assist in relaying information concerning the evacuation of American dependents and other American citizens." This is hardly impressive. Skeptical observers will continue to assume that *Liberty* was engaged upon a general mission of intelligence-gathering and codebreaking; and they will wonder what might have been received, translated, tape-recorded, and fed into computers between, say, 10 o'clock and noon on June 8 that resulted in the pinpoint destruction of the very

hull compartments—frame 53 to frame 66—where the electronic gear was housed.

The unanswered questions nag for answers. For the time being, one puts them to the side. On great ships of war, operating in war zones, one comes to expect death, destruction, and heroism. The fire on *Oriskany* last fall, the fearful inferno on *Forrestal* on July 29, were terrible reminders of the violence of war. Men rose to the crises superbly. They were in the true sense, heroes. It is a little different when a virtually unarmed communications ship, navigating peacefully under a neutral flag, is taken by surprise. There too, as Admiral McCain remarked, "heroism was the order of the day." Commander McGonagle has been recommended for an appropriate award.

[From the Zarephath (N.J.) Herald of Freedom, July 28, 1967]

## THE RAPE OF THE U.S.S. "LIBERTY"

When is a "war crime" not a war crime and when is an "atrocity" not an atrocity? The answer plainly is, "When the propaganda apparatus of the guilty party is able to convince the world that the act in question was an 'accident.' " However, as the saying goes, you can fool some of the people, etc. One not fooled is the Hon. Craig Hoemer, Republican Congressman from California. The Congressional Record of June 29, 1967, p. H8285 records his remarks as follows: "I can only conclude that the coordinated attack by aircraft and motor torpedo boats on the U.S.S. *Liberty* 15½ miles north of Sinai on June 8 which killed 34 officers and men of the Navy and wounded another 75 was deliberate."

Rep. Hoemer continued: "The fact that the U.S.S. *Liberty* was a Victory hull vessel, hundreds of which were produced and used by the U.S. Navy during World War II and since, rules out the possibility of mistaken identity. Every ship recognition book in the world has, for years, identified the characteristic Victory hull and superstructure of the U.S.S. *Liberty* as U.S. Navy property."

"Whatever is the reason for the attack, it was an act of high piracy. Those responsible should be court-martialed on charges of murder, amongst other counts. The Israel Government should pay full reparations to the United States and indemnities to the families of the Americans killed."

Congressman Thomas G. Abernethy, a Democrat from Mississippi, made the following remarks on the same day as reported on Page H8286 of the Congressional Record: "The *Liberty* ship incident—and indeed it was more than an incident—has been treated entirely too lightly by this Government. To say the least, too little has been said about it. This useless, unnecessary and inexcusable attack took the lives of 34 American boys, wounded 75 others, and left many others in a state of horrified shock, to say nothing of what it did to a flag-flying vessel of the U.S. Navy. How could this be treated so lightly in this the greatest Capitol in all the world?"

"I have heard Members of this House, and many, many others, say that if this had been done by others, the leaders of our Government would have moved in with sternness and appropriate demands or even retaliatory action."

Rep. Abernethy continued: "These men at all times are entitled to the strong backing of every citizen of this land of every race and every creed. They are entitled to and should have the strong arm, as well as the strong voice of their Government and their people behind them. And who has spoken out in their behalf from this land since some of their number were so suddenly shot down and others so severely wounded on the *Liberty* ship?"

"What complaint have we registered? What has Washington said? To tell you the truth, this great Capitol as well as this great Gov-

ernment—If it can still be called great—was and is as quiet as the tomb regarding this horrible event. . . . The Pentagon stressed that the Liberty was clearly marked, that it was in international waters, that it had a right to be where it was, and that the attack was incessant, heavy and hard; that the attack came from both planes and torpedo boats, designed not simply to knock out but to destroy the ship and its men."

The Israeli Government maintains a strict press censorship so the article from which the following quotes are taken would have had to have government approval for its release. This was written for The Associated Press by Micha Limor, a member of the Israel Naval Reserve who was on duty on one of the Israeli motor torpedo boats that attacked the U.S.S. Liberty, and appeared in the N.Y. Times of July 7, 1967. The Times, which prides itself on reporting "facts," printed Limor's story which contains many contradictions to the facts as brought out by the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry.

Among these doubtful "facts," we read: "The high masts and the many weird antenna showed that this was a warship." . . . "We could see no flag on the mast nor was anyone to be seen on the decks and bridge." . . . "We spent several minutes trying to contact the ship and demanding identification. We tried by radio and by heliograph, in accordance with internationally accepted means." We should note here that Israeli planes had already had the U.S.S. Liberty under surveillance for many hours and had made six separate strafing attacks on the ship which was flying the American flag and that, after the regular flag (5 feet by 8 feet) was shot down, the Captain of the Liberty had a special holiday flag (7 feet by 13 feet) hoisted.

Israeli Reservist Limor continues with his tall tale: "We wanted to make the ship surrender without sinking her. Once again we circled the vessel in battle formation, firing again and again. This had no effect. No one appeared. No one reacted." (Unfortunately it would have been difficult for the dead Americans strewn on the Liberty's deck to rise up and "react.") Not to be daunted the brave Israelis continued and, says Limor, "Dozens of shells, rockets and torpedoes were needed to drag a sign of identity from them. . . ."

That the boats were in constant contact with Tel Aviv is indicated by the following statement:

"We received orders directly from the officer commanding the navy to give all necessary help. So we approached the Liberty and offered help, shouting through a loudspeaker.

"Then an officer appeared for the first time on the bridge and screamed, 'Go to hell!'"

"Learning they did not need aid, we left."

Time magazine of July 6, 1967 pointed out that the Liberty had her name on the stern in English and that the Court produced evidence that the Israelis had ample opportunity to identify the Liberty correctly. On June 17, 1967, the Associated Press reported from Valetta, Malta, that senior crewmen of the damaged U.S. Navy research and communications ship Liberty were convinced that Israel's air and torpedo boat attack that cost 34 American lives was deliberate. A survivor was quoted as stating: "We were flying the Stars and Stripes and its absolutely impossible that they shouldn't know who we were. This was a deliberate and planned attack and the remarkable thing about it was the accuracy of their air fire."

There have been some strange activities on the part of the Department of Defense in connection with this case. The attack occurred on June 8 yet parents of wounded sailors did not know whether their sons were alive or dead until they finally received telegrams on June 11. The wounded were taken by helicopter from the U.S.S. Liberty to the aircraft carrier U.S.S. America, and, on ar-

rival, were warned by a representative of the C.I.A. not to talk to anyone about what had happened. Those with head wounds were taken to a U.S. Army hospital at Landstuhl, Germany, and, while there, were kept under guard with tight security. Reliable sources have advised that the many communication technicians who were aboard the Liberty have been dispersed to other assignments separately in different parts of the world. A confidential source advised that there was a deliberate jamming of radio communications being sent by the U.S.S. Liberty to the Commander of the Sixth Fleet. This jamming reportedly came from Israeli sources and necessitated changing the radio communication circuits. The Liberty for this reason was unable to call for help when the first attack came.

The U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry was convened by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe. Classified hearings were conducted in London and aboard the U.S.S. Liberty in Malta from June 11 to 17, 1967. The Court consisted of Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, USN (reported selected by the Administration in Washington, D.C.) and U.S. Navy Captains Bert M. Atkinson and Bernard J. Lauff who are attached to Admiral McCain's Headquarters. The Court's findings were presented to Admiral McCain and approved by him on June 18, 1967.

Among the findings were: There was significant surveillance of the U.S.S. Liberty on three separate occasions—five hours and thirteen minutes before the attack, three hours and thirteen minutes before the attack and two hours and thirty-seven minutes before the attack. . . . There were five to six separate air attacks on the U.S.S. Liberty with at least two or more planes participating in each attack. The U.S.S. Liberty had arrived at the designated location June 8, 1967 with orders to steam in an area bounded by latitude 32 north on east and west by longitude 34 east and 33 east, 12.5 nautical miles from the coast. The U.S.S. Liberty steamed on June 8th south easterly 130° true until 8:49 A.M. when she reached the eastern boundary of operating area and turned to a southwesterly course 253° true. At 8:50 A.M. a single unidentified jet crossed her wake at an estimated 3 to 5 miles astern, then circled the ship and returned to the mainland. The Liberty was flying normal American flag, 5' by 8'. Jet and propeller aircraft circled the ship at 10:56 A.M. and at the time the Liberty was steaming at only five knots. At 2 P.M. the ship's Captain, Commander William L. McGonagle, of Norfolk, Va., fixed her position by radar as 25.5 nautical miles from the minaret of ElArish which was to the southeast bearing 142° true.

The reconstructed ship's log reads as follows:

"From the official records of the U.S. Naval Board of Inquiry.

"Requested 8 June chronology follows

"1. Approaching land from the west during the early morning hours of 8 June, projected operations of Liberty for the morning and afternoon of the day was to proceed to a point 13 nautical miles from the coast of UAR (United Arab Republic) at 31-27. 2N 34-00E (Point Alpha A) thence to 31-22. 3N 33-42E (Point Bravo B) thence to 31-31N 33-00E (Point Charlie C) retracing this track until new orders received, ship would operate north of this track line at all times, if fixes could not be accurately obtained as Point Charlie was approached it was intended to head due north until the 100 fathom curve was crossed and the track moved to the north to more or less move back and forth on the general average of the 100 fathom curve. Normal steaming speed was to be five knots. Normal steaming colors were flown and normal navigational lights lighted at night. There was no intention to steam

at darken ship at any time and the ship did not even exercise at darken-ship drill during the deployment.

"2. All times bravo unless otherwise indicated.

"0754 Steaming on 130 T. SPD 10 knots.

"0849 Passed through Point Alpha changed CSE (course) to 263 T.

"0850 Single Jet A/C (aircraft) (unidentified) crossed astern distance 3-5 miles—circled ship from STBD to port and returned to UAR mainland.

"0905 decreased SPD (speed) to 5 knots.

"1058 Another A/C circled ship—high.

"1126 Another A/C circled ship.

"1132 Passed through Point Bravo C/C (changed course) to 283 T.

"1310 Exercised at G.Q. (general quarters) drill.

"1348 Secured from G.Q. drill.

"1351 3 small surface contacts held on radar 32,000 yards bearing.

"082T—Reported to bridge as 3 surface contact.

"1353 Radar reports possible A/C passing over surface contacts.

"1358 Single A/C sighted approaching ship from 135 deg. Relative 5-6 miles distance. altitude approximately 7000 ft. A/C passed down track of ship.

"1403 Loud explosion—port side amidships.

"1406 Sounded general alarm—large fire in vicinity of frame 85, 01 level where fuel for motor driven fire pumps are located.

"1405 All ahead flank signalled by engine order telegraph.

"1405—1410 Ship under repeated air attack with two or more A/C making coordinated strafing, rocket, and incendiary runs over ship. Three major fires topside covering large areas of ship with flames and heavy smoke a total of eight men were killed or died as a result of injuries received during the air attack, one killed and one mortally wounded on bridge, two killed at machine gun 51, one killed at machine gun 52, one died from wounds received on the main deck starboard side and two died of wounds received on the 01 level port side. Approximately seventy five wounded, including commanding officer, throughout topside area from shrapnel and shock of exploding rockets.

"1410 Began making turns for 18 knots.

"1424 3 MTBs (motor torpedo boats) sighted abaft starboard—beam distance 4-5 miles.

"1426 Noticed normal streaming ensign shot away during air attack. Holiday size ensign hoisted on port yardarm.

"1428 MTB signaling by flashing light from STBD quarter. Light obscured by dense smoke from burning motor whaleboat.

"1430 one round fired by machine gun 51, C.O. (commanding officer) ordered hold fire.

"1431 machine gun 53 opened fire. C.O. sent Ens. Lucas around port side of bridge to get machine gun 53 to cease firing.

"1431 word passed to standby for torpedo attack to starboard. MTB commenced strafing starboard side of ship.

"1434 torpedo passed 75 yards astern of ship.

"1435 torpedo hit starboard side amidships. Twenty-six men died as a result of the torpedo hit and MTB strafing fire.

"1435 lost electrical power throughout the ship.

"1436 lost steam pressure—secured engines and boilers—many gauges and meters in fire-room and engine room were knocked out.

"1440 MTBs standing away from the ship. One MTB has hull number 206-17.

"1503 one MTB returned to ship and signalled "do you need help" in English. C.O. signalled "negative."

"1506 MTBs retired toward shore.

"1507 helicopter bearing Star of David markings approached ship, port side, hovering at about 500 yds. distance.



"1508 second helicopter approached ship. Markings on helicopters are 04 and 08 or D4 and D8. Helicopter made repeated passes around and over ship. They were not observed to pick up any bodies, persons or debris.

"1519 power restored to bridge but rudder did not answer—continued steering from after steering.

"1536 MTBs approaching ship starboard side 7-8 miles distant. During next hour and a quarter the MTBs returned to the ship and by 1713 they had retired out of sight over the horizon.

"1615 two unidentified jet A/C approached ship from the STBD side and reconnoitered from a distance.

"1620 attempting to clear area steering northerly course at speeds varying from 0 to 8 knots. Personnel casualties were treated in the wardroom on a continuing basis, damage control and fire fighting controlled flooding and damage, engineering casualties were restored but steering was by hand from after steering.

"1845 Israeli helicopter approached ship—circled close aboard and attempted to align—they appeared to desire to lower someone to the deck—C.O. considered receiving him on forecastle and ruled this out as too hazardous. Repeated attempts to communicate were unsuccessful. And at 1852 copter dropped a message packet on forecastle, the message, written on a calling card of the U.S. naval attaché Tel Aviv, asked "have you casualties." Ship tried by several means to indicate, during next ten minutes that there were many casualties but there was no indication that the message was understood, the mutilated bodies of three dead crew members had not yet been removed from the forecastle and must have been observed from the helicopter. The helicopter departed the ship shortly before sunset (about 1905) ship continued steaming through night to RDVU (rendezvous) with escorts dispatched by COMSIXTHFLT (Commander Sixth Fleet).

"3. Foregoing constitutes detailed reconstruction from QM (quarter master) notebook, CIC Log, bell book and best recollection of CO/Chief Engr/gun and bridge personnel. All concur."

In the event it seems difficult to believe that the attack was deliberate we are outlining the story of a previous strange happening related by attorney Alfred M. Lillenthal in his book, "The Other Side of the Coin." (Devin-Adair, N.Y.C.) Mr. Lillenthal is of the Jewish faith, was formerly a State Department official, and is considered an expert on the Middle East. After discussing the improvement in relations between the United States and Egypt between 1952 and 1954, the author states:

"This situation was viewed in high Israeli quarters as a grave threat to the continued flow of American dollars into Israel from public, if not private, sources. A direct severance of relations between Egypt and the U.S. was deemed desirable. An Israeli espionage ring was sent to Egypt to bomb official United States offices and, if necessary, to attack American personnel working there so as to destroy Egyptian-U.S. and, eventually, Arab-U.S. relations."

"... two young Jewish Egyptian boys carrying identical bombs were caught as they were about to enter U.S. installations. Upon their confessions, a sabotage gang was rounded up of six other Jews. The conspirators, who received sentences ranging from 15 years to life, were the objects in the U.S. of multifold sympathetic editorials and articles. Nothing appeared in print at the time to combat the image of another Nasser conspiracy to unite his country against Israel.

"In 1960 an investigation in Israel called attention to the forgery of an important document in what had been announced as a 'security mishap' that precipitated the resignation of Pinhas Lavon as Minister of De-

fense in 1955. Lavon had been at odds with others in the Ministry of Defense, including Deputy Minister Shimon Peres and General Moshe Dayan, who had been seeking some excuse to force his resignation. The forgery placed the legal responsibility for this unsuccessful sabotage attempt at Lavon's door, even though he, at the time, had called it 'a stupid and immoral act.'

"From the outset Lavon had denounced the document as a forgery and had pressed for an investigation. . . . But Prime Minister Ben Gurion fought the reopening of the case. . . . However, late in 1960 the Cabinet ordered an investigation, which, under the direction of Attorney General Gideon Hausner, revealed clearly that Lavon's signature had, in fact, been forged by a high-ranking officer in the ministry, that Lavon had never ordered this sabotage operation and that false testimony had been given in an earlier inquiry. Israel's Ministry of Defense, presided over by General Moshe Dayan and Brigadier Abraham Givli, proved to be involved."

Gen. Dayan, involved in previous skulduggery, is obviously capable of deceptive action and coverups. The Liberty could have been a menace to his secret plans and the Shreveport (La.) Times of June 18, 1967 has brought out an interesting chronology of events:

"June 7: The Liberty took up its post off the Sinai Peninsula. In New York, Foreign Minister Abba Eban . . . was proclaiming that 'only Israel has accepted the U.N. cease fire mandate.'

"Later developments showed that even as Abba Eban spoke, Israel was massing columns of tanks, sizable forces of mechanized infantry, and squadrons of jet warplanes on the Syrian border for invasion of Syria. . . .

"There was no normal way for the U.S. or the U.N. to learn of the military buildup at the Syrian border; except that the Liberty was now only 15 miles offshore from Egypt and Israel. . . .

"June 8: The Liberty was put out of action by Israel.

"June 9: Israel invaded Syria, an act that was almost as big a shock to the world as the war itself."

When the Liberty was able to get its calls for assistance through to the Sixth Fleet, the American Navy was prevented from going to her rescue. Counterattack of July 14, 1967 states:

"The Sixth Fleet responded by ordering two deck loads of planes to the assistance of the Liberty. President Johnson meanwhile had opened the hot line to Moscow at the urging of advisors. Precisely what the President said to Moscow about American planes being in the air may never be recorded. . . .

"But it is known that Naval Operations, acting in response to high authority, ordered Admiral William I. Martin, commanding the Sixth Fleet, to recall the planes forming in the air for attack. In seconds, Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations was on the radio telephone repeating and emphasizing the order."

A report of the Navy's investigation of the attack on the Liberty tells of other orders: "Early on the 8th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued order for Liberty to move farther from the coast, even though such a move would partially degrade her mission. The messages were misrouted, delayed and not received until after the attack." (Shades of Pearl Harbor!)

The U.S. News & World Report of July 10, 1967 states concerning the "mystery of what happened to the messages:"—"One reason cited for delay: The order went by normal communications instead of through emergency channels that would have reached the Liberty immediately." (This is the same reason given for official failure to warn the sitting duck fleet at Pearl Harbor.) The article states:

"Why did the Israelis attack? . . . From Israel came this explanation: When the Liberty was challenged by an Israeli torpedo boat, it answered with the signal that had been used by Egyptian ships during the 1956 Suez war. Consequently, the Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship."

With their Government failing to act, a group of American citizens is moving against Israel, demanding justice for the killed and injured officers and men. An organization has been formed called the Committee for Immediate Action-Families and Friends of Victims of the U.S.S. Liberty, 212 Coolidge St., Linden, N.J. Two of the leaders of the organization are Mr. and Mrs. Thomas J. Reilly, Sr., parents of two servicemen who were aboard the U.S.S. Liberty at the time of the attack, Robert, age 18, and Thomas, Jr., age 20, who is in St. Albans Naval Hospital with a fractured skull and a piece of shrapnel in his brain. These parents have instituted a suit against the Government of Israel, demanding that the Government of Israel be condemned for this action; that the Captains of the torpedo gunboats and the strafing aircraft be brought before a tribunal of the United States and Israeli Governments and charged with murder and maiming innocent persons; and that the Government of Israel be compelled to pay punitive damages of fifty million dollars.

The attack by the Israelis on the U.S.S. Liberty was deliberate and planned, the ship having been strafed and torpedoed so viciously that there were over 800 holes in its hull. Had the Israeli forces been successful in sinking the Liberty the atrocity would probably have been blamed on the Arabs and Egyptians producing a Pearl Harbor reaction in the United States. Was the attack to turn the U.S. against the Arabs or to destroy information picked up by the communications ship? Whatever devious purpose prompted the attack we may never know, but we do know that it was a war crime of the greatest magnitude.

THE 49TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, BOSTON, MASS., AUGUST 29, 30, 31, 1967

#### RESOLUTION NO. 508

Committee: Foreign Relations.  
Subject: U.S.S. Liberty Incident.

Whereas, on June 8, 1967, the U.S.S. Liberty—while operating in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean—was the target of an apparent deliberate attack by Israel's war planes and torpedo boats; and

Whereas, this unwarranted and unprovoked attack killed 34 members of the Liberty's crew, and wounded 75 other U.S. Navy personnel on board, in addition to causing extensive damage to the ship; and

Whereas, the U.S. Government's official inquiry covered the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the fact that the ship was "properly marked as to her identity and nationality, and in calm, clear weather" when attacked, but the published report fails to provide the American public with a satisfactory answer as to the reason for the attack; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, by the American Legion in National Convention assembled in Boston, Massachusetts, August 29, 30, 31, 1967, That The American Legion denounces and condemns Israel's irresponsible attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, a United States ship and its crew; and be it

Further resolved, That The American Legion insists that the United States Government conduct a complete and thorough investigation of this incident, with the results to be made public insofar as security permits; and be it

Further resolved, That The United States Government demand full payment from the Israeli Government for:

(1) compensation to the next of kin of the deceased;

(2) compensation to the wounded for injuries and residual disabilities; and

(3) damages to the property of the United States.

### BRITAIN ENCOURAGES ARMED AGGRESSION

(Mr. RARICK (at the request of Mr. HECHER of West Virginia) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, on August 31, 1967, I entered remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD which appeared on page A4430 regarding the invasion of Rhodesia by terrorist bands who were equipped principally by the Russian and Chinese Communists.

As a further sequel to those remarks, I have received a copy of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's letter to Harold Wilson of Great Britain dated August 28, 1967.

This communication gives further insight into terrorist activities in a most authoritative manner.

Mr. Speaker, with consent granted I enter at this point the Prime Minister's letter:

NOTE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT  
FROM THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT

AUGUST 28, 1967.

The Rhodesia Government wishes to draw urgently to the attention of the British Government the following situation in Rhodesia.

2—Leaders of the two banned Rhodesian African Nationalist Organizations, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) are now firmly established in Zambia and it is from Lusaka that these people plan subversive operations directed against the Government of Rhodesia, including the infiltration of armed terrorists and offensive materials into this country.

3—At one time the President of Zambia, through his security forces, tried to control the movement of terrorists and offensive materials through his country. From about the middle of 1966, however, when Rhodesian terrorist activities commenced to increase, all vestige of control appears to have vanished and the Zambian Government has since progressed from a policy of ignoring or condoning such activities to one of offering direct encouragement.

4—Rhodesian terrorists receive training in a number of communist countries, including Russia, Red China, Cuba and Algeria, and also at three or more camps in Tanzania. Irrespective of their place of training, terrorists invariably move from Tanzania to Zambia where they are billeted in specially constructed holding camps, established in the vicinity of Lusaka and within easy striking distance of Rhodesia.

5—In Zambia there are also a number of centres used by subversive organizations for the storage of arms, ammunition and other offensive materials used in the equipping of terrorist groups. At their respective holding camp ZAPU and ZANU Party officials indoctrinate the terrorists in Communist and Party Ideology, particularly in the context of the part they are to play in creating a sense of fear and uncertainty in Rhodesia.

6—Groups for terrorist incursions into Rhodesia are issued with arms and equipment and conveyed, quite openly, in ZAPU or ZANU vehicles along one or other of the Zambian road complexes to the Rhodesian

border, where they are finally instructed on methods of infiltration and briefed on their targets in Rhodesia. During the hours of darkness they are expected to infiltrate across the Zambezi River into this country.

7—Not only does the Zambian Government condone the activities of Rhodesian terrorists in that country, but it is known that on occasions Zambian Government officials actually assist these people in passing through the border between Zambia and Tanzania.

8—The main supplier of arms and other offensive materials used by Rhodesian terrorists is the African Liberation Committee (A.L.C.) of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) in Dar es Salaam. Here the material is received from a number of Communist countries and is stored by the Tanzanian Government, which is responsible for the control and subsequent issue of this material to various Nationalist movements.

9—Although there is no proof of direct co-operation between the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia in respect of the movement of offensive material, it is known that the former Government has already suggested to the latter that it adopts some method of control. It is extremely unlikely that the Zambian Government is ignorant of the movement and storage of terrorist arms in Zambia.

10—Since terrorist activity against Rhodesia was intensified about the middle of last year, an ever-increasing number of armed men, of both the ZAPU and ZANU factions, have been infiltrated into this country from Zambia. Initially, only small groups of terrorists entered across the Zambezi River from Zambia. In recent months larger bands—comprising up to thirty or more terrorists—have crossed into Rhodesia. Little credence can therefore be given to any denial by the Zambian Government that it is unaware of the movement of such large numbers of men and quantities of material.

11—The current security operation being waged against the large band of mixed South African African National Congress (SAANC) and ZAPU terrorists in Western Matabeleland shows without any doubt that the Zambian authorities are not only prepared to condone terrorist activities directed against Rhodesia, but are also willing to allow their country to be used as a rallying point for terrorists bent on a campaign of violence against South Africa.

12—The recent threat issued by the Organization of African Unity to Rhodesian nationalists that they can expect no further financial support unless they can produce proof of militant action against Rhodesia has had a two-fold effect. It has influenced both ZAPU and ZANU to intensify the infiltration of terrorists from Zambia across the Zambezi River, and has stimulated ZAPU to abduct over two hundred Rhodesian Africans, in legitimate employment in Zambia, for terrorist training in Tanzania. Thus the Zambian Government has become further implicated by permitting these activities with little or no intervention.

13—On the 19th August in Lusaka, James Robert Chikerema, Vice President of ZAPU, and Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the SAANC, issued a joint Press release extolling the activities of their combined terrorist groups presently operating in Western Matabeleland.

14—The aim of these terrorist bands is to carry out indiscriminate killing, burning and looting in rural and urban areas. The Rhodesian Government will adopt the most vigorous measures to protect the people and their property and to seek out and destroy these terrorist bands and individual gunmen.

15—The British Government cannot escape its share of responsibility for these developments. There has been a complete absence of any protest by the British Govern-

ment to the Zambian Government about the passage of arms and offensive material, the reception and harbouring of communist trained terrorists and the use of Zambia as a base for offensive operations against Rhodesia.

16—Here is a case where a Government of one Commonwealth country is lending itself to a policy of violence against another Commonwealth country which has committed no aggression and desired to be friendly and co-operative. The Rhodesian Government considers that Britain continues to have obligations in Zambia to influence that Government toward a policy of moderation and the discouragement of violence against Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Government accordingly lodges a strong protest against the British Government's lack of action in this respect and against its connivance of the hostile attitude of the Zambian Government towards peace and good government in Rhodesia.

Mr. Speaker, the British Government snubbed its "royal" nose at this well-documented and substantiated report. Such action by a supposedly peace-seeking nation—as Great Britain claims to be—clearly emphasizes once again the Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde approach the British now follow.

It further underscores a serious lack of national principle by that Government.

Mr. Speaker, I place the Rhodesian Prime Minister's remarks to Parliament on this matter at this point:

"TERRORIST INCURSION FROM ZAMBIA"—  
PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT

With the leave of the House, I wish to make a statement. I lay on the Table of the House a copy of the Note of 28th August, 1967, which the Rhodesia Government handed to the British Government yesterday in London drawing to the attention of the British Government the recent spate of terrorist incursions into Rhodesia, pointing out to them the encouragement and assistance given to these terrorists by the Zambian Government and, more important, emphasizing the fact that the British Government cannot escape its share of responsibility for these developments.

The British Government has rejected this Note. The head of the Rhodesian Residual Mission in London was informed that the Commonwealth Office had examined the document and had declared that it could not be accepted because Her Majesty's Government do not recognize the Rhodesian Government and cannot therefore accept any diplomatic Note emanating from them in that capacity.

I think this action by the British Government clearly expresses their disregard for the well-being of Rhodesia, in spite of their protests that they are opposed to violence and disorder. This attitude is in strange contrast to the military and police support which Rhodesia and Rhodesian forces have willingly given to the Commonwealth in the past.

I will not deal with the period of the last great war—the part played by Rhodesia throughout this epic struggle is too well known to warrant repetition.

Confining myself to the post-war era, let me remind Britain that in 1951 Rhodesia provided two fighter squadrons as a contribution to Commonwealth defense. For a further post-war period Rhodesia became the home of a Royal Air Force training group and the Rhodesian Government contributed towards its upkeep. From 1956 to 1963, on nine different occasions, Rhodesian Vampire and Canberra squadrons were detached to Aden and Cyprus respectively and while there were under British command. In 1961 Rhodesian transport aircraft provided not-