David Lucas testifies
for the
USS Liberty Court of Inquiry
June 13, 1967
At Malta, the hour 0755, the date 13 June 1967. This court
of inquiry is now in session again. All persons connected
with the Court who were present when the Court adjourned in
London, England on 11 June 1967 are again present in Court
except that the Assistant Counsel for the Court who is now
present will be sworn.
The Assistant Counsel for the court, Lieutenant Commander
Allen Feingersch, U. S. Navy, was sworn.
Ensign David G. Lucas, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the
stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights
under article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and
examined as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Questions by counsel for the Court:
Q. Please state your name, rank, organization, and present
duties station.
A. Ensign David G. Lucas, First Lieutenant and Gunnery
Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).
Let the record show that this witness is being called out of
order in order that he may be medically evacuated to a
hospital ashore for [deleted] and that he is experiencing
considerable physical discomfort at this time.
Q. Mr. Lucas, as you are well aware, this Court of
Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances
attendant with the armed
[12]
attack on the U. S. Naval vessel, USS Liberty, which
occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the
court the circumstances of that incident that you recall?
A.. Yes Sir. We had a general quarters drill which secured
shortly prior to 1400. After securing from the drill I came
to the wardroom and was in the presence of Lieutenant Golden
and Ensign Scott. Ensign Scott left the wardroom and we
heard the word passed over the 1MC to stand clear of the
motor whaleboat while testing engines. Very shortly after
that word was passed we heard what sounded like a very loud
thump or crash. Mr. Golden and I half jumped from our
seats, we looked at each other, and both thought that the
motor whaleboat had fallen from its davit onto the deck. We
went to the closest porthole, pulled the curtains, and did
see some dust and black smoke rising. It was at this time
that the general quarters alarm was sounded, and we knew
that we had been attacked. I went into the passageway
outside the wardroom via athwartships passageway to the
starboard side of the main deck and from there used the
ladder to go to the bridge, the 03 level. Upon arriving on
the bridge I got my battle helmet and my life jacket from
the starboard gear locker and was just getting ready to go
to my general quarters station which is on the 04 level, the
flying bridge. We were hit by what I assume to be the
second pass of aircraft. Another man was next to me. I
think he was a signalman. We both hit the deck just outside
the starboard hatch leading to the pilothouse. Three or
four shells hit in our area. After that shelling had
ceased, I went into the pilothouse, didn't figure it was too
safe to go to the 04 level at that time. Another pass was
made and everyone in the pilothouse hit the deck. When I did
enter the pilothouse, the officer of the deck for general
quarters, LT. O'CONNER, had already been injured and had
been carried into CIC, which is just aft of the
pilothouse. The junior officer of the deck at general
quarters, LT ENNIS, was lying in the after portion of the
pilothouse and appears to have [deleted]. I can't recall
what other personnel were on the bridge at that time. It
consisted
[13]
of several phone talkers and a third class quartermaster,
BROWN, was at the helm, which was his general quarters
station. I left the pilothouse, came to the wardroom to
learn the condition of LT. O'CONNER and LT Ennis. Came down
the ladder in the superstructure. When I got to the 02
level, the men were carrying the Executive Officer LCDR
ARMSTRONG, down to the wardroom for medical aid. At the
time I saw him, he appeared to be in shock, was very pale,
and was not saying anything. Mr. ENNIS had gotten partially
down - they were having difficulty carrying him down and he
was in the passageway outside his stateroom, waiting for
attention to his leg. I came into the wardroom and there
were at least half a dozen casualties in there being
treated. Several of the enlisted men had been in the spaces
forward of the superstructure, and the IC shop and the
emergency diesel room. These areas had been shelled very
heavily on one of the first passes. I found out the
emergency diesel did not work and that the gyro was not
functioning either. I left the wardroom area. Somehow we
received word that there was a fire burning on the 01 level,
port side. It was in the vicinity where two 55 gallon drums
of P-250 fuel was stored. Some enlisted men in the
passageways got a hose and were putting out the fire. The
fire had spread aft of the P-250 cans and the four life
rafts were burning on the 01 level. I can't remember the
exact amount of time that I did spend in the superstructure
area. When I was in the passageways, I hear we did receive
some more shelling. I returned to the bridge. To the best
of my knowledge, when I did return to the bridge, the only
people present were the Commanding Officer, one phone
talker, who was lying on the deck in the chart room,
quartermaster BROWN on the helm and myself. Before I went
back to the bridge, we had received word over the phones
that were working, we had very little communication as such,
the 1MC was hit and not functioning. The only communications
we had were via sound-powered phones. We had received the
word "standby for a torpedo attack". It was very shortly
after I returned to the bridge the Commanding Officer
hollered in to pass over all circuits, "standby for another
torpedo attack, starboard side".
[14]
The torpedo hit and it seemed like within a matter of
seconds we had a ten degree starboard list. Shortly after
that the Commanding Officer called me to the starboard wing,
asked me to get some glasses to try to help him identify the
patrol craft. He had been using his binoculars and was also
taking photographs of the aircraft and of the three patrol
craft. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. I was
able to read the hull number on one patrol craft as it
passed abeam to starboard, going in exactly the opposite
direction that we were going, and it was at this time I told
the Commanding Officer what the number was. He said, "log
it". Which I did, in the quartermasters notebook. At that
time, there was no quartermaster available. This was the
first entry that I made in the log. I continued to make
entries for approximately the next 45 minutes. There were
still just the four people on the bridge. This was the
Commanding Officer, third class quartermaster BROWN on the
helm, and seaman LAMAR on the sound-powered phones, and
myself. The Captain warned us to take cover, the shelling
started again. Everyone took cover as best we could. There
were shells, or fragments of shells, flying in through the
starboard hatch, which no one had been able to secure. A
quartermaster, when these shells started flying, stepped
back from the helm to get as much protection from the corner
of the chart room as possible. He still had his hand, one
hand on the wheel. I was two paces to his left, and two
paces behind him. A fragment hit him, I think from behind.
It must have come through the bulkhead in the chart room.
He let out a gasp, fell backwards into the chart room, and
within, say a minute, was dead. I grabbed the helm, noticed
that I had no power at all, the gyro repeater was not
functioning, the rudder angle indicator was not functioning.
None of the instruments there were working. We had been
attempting to get away from the area as fast as possible, on
an approximate course of 000. The Captain asked what the
current heading was. We were turning in a fairly good sized
arc at that time. I had no indication of how much rudder I
had on. I could not correct it to steer something close to
000 magnetic. We get the phone
[15]
talker to contact after steering and shifted control to
after steering. Even after control was shifted, the people
back there were having a difficult time. I think to start
with, they were steering by hand. There was some firing
from the patrol boats. They had periodically fired at us.
There was now a lull in the firing. And yet, it sounded as
if the men at mount 53, this would be the 03 level starboard
side aft of the pilothouse, it sounded as if they were
firing at the patrol craft who at that time were within a
thousand yards at an approximate relative bearing of 120.
The Commanding Officer was on the starboard wing and had
these patrol craft in view. He ordered me to tell the men
on mount 53 to cease firing. A fire had started at this
time on the starboard side. The hit had occurred somewhere
in the vicinity of the bridge. The flames had gone back to
the motor whaleboat, and it was burning rapidly at that
time. I could not see mount 53 from the starboard side. I
went out the port hatch. The first thing I noticed was
mount 54 was vacant. The flames from the liferaft and the
P-250 fuel had reached mount 54 and chased everyone out of
there. I ran back to mount 54, looked over the skylight
from the engineering spaces. Had a clear view of mount 53
from, say the waste level up, and there was no one on mount
53. The flames from the motor whaleboat were coming over
the lip of the mount. I assume that the bullets that were
in the gun, or bullets that were in a ready service
ammunition box, very near there, were cooking off and
firing. I ran back, reported to the Commanding Officer,
that there was no one firing from mount 53, that the flames
must be causing the bullets to cook off. Mount 51 and 52 on
the forecastle had been long silent by this time. Many of
the men, there were three assigned to each mount, many of
the men were killed on the first strafing attack. When I
first did look forward at the mounts, there was one man cut
in half on mount 51, and it looked as if there were at least
two men in mount 52 who were severed. After that time, I
believe there was just one more shot fired. A seaman,
LARKINS, was told to man mount 51, either told or he
volunteered to, and he got off one shot, the Commanding
Officer hollered for him to cease
[16]
fire, which he did. I can recall no further firing from
either side after that time. The Commanding Officer
hollered "cease fire", and it was approximately at this time
the patrol craft were bearing approximately 160 relative.
One of them was trying to signal us. The smoke from the
motor whaleboat almost completely obscured the patrol craft
from us. There was a second class signalman, DAVID, on the
starboard wing. None of us were able to determine what the
signaling was - the smoke was too intense. Shortly after
that, another patrol craft approached us from the starboard
side and did manage to get clear of the smoke. The
signalman took the message, "do you need help? ". The
Commanding Officer told signalman DAVID to give a negative
reply. We still did not know the identity of the patrol
craft itself other than the fact than we had gotten the hull
number earlier. This appeared to be one of the same three
boats that had attacked us earlier. The patrol craft then
appeared to rendezvous at two to three thousand yards astern
of us, a relative bearing of 200. A helicopter was sighted,
and then a second helicopter. Signalman DAVID who is very
knowledgeable on aircraft and who had also been looking at
Janes Aircraft several days prior to the attack, stated,
"those aren't ours, they're Russian made, Sikorsky models".
One of the helos came close to the port wing, came down to
our level, and we tried to communicate with each other, but
had no success. I was told to go to the forecastle to see
if I could aid in a sling drop. It appeared as if they
wanted to lower someone on the ship. We still could not get
our signals straight. When I did get on the forecastle, I
saw the Commanding Officer waving his arms in a negative
sign. We waived the helicopter away from the area of the
forecastle. It went back to the port wing again.
Eventually, someone in the helo wrapped up a package of some
sort and threw it to the people on the bridge. To the best
of my recollection the people on the bridge were the
Commanding Officer, signalman DAVID and a Chief petty
Officer THOMPSON. The package had a calling card attached
to it and it either said, "U. S. Naval Attach‚, Tel Aviv",
or merely, "Naval Attach‚, Tel Aviv". We did
[17]
get the numbers of both helicopters in the quartermasters
log. They were either "04 or D4" and "08 or D8". There
also appeared to be a "Star of David" on the side of the
helo. The helo was waved away shortly after the calling
card was thrown over, we saw no more of the helos. Now it
was the matter of still trying to get the ship out of the
area. We had no idea whether we would be attacked again or
not. The list had held steady at approximately 10 degrees.
After steering was able to keep us on somewhat of a
northerly course, although we were weaving anywhere from 30
to 40 degrees either side of our chosen magnetic course of
000. I was getting the rudder angles to steer for awhile
called back to after steering and then the Commanding
Officer was giving them after that. The Commanding Officer
had been injured in his right leg on what must have been the
first aircraft pass. He was bleeding profusely. The
Captain had been administered first aid and he had a belt
tourniquet around his leg. He insisted on being everywhere
that he could. He was on both wings, in and out of the
pilothouse, taking pictures. I believe at the time I was
giving orders to after steering the bleeding had started
again on the Captains leg wound. I'm just theorizing that
the shell fragment that was lodged in the leg had been
discharged by his movement. We called the corpsman, and the
Captain was stretched out on the port wing, being
administered first aid. He was still calling orders in to
me to relay on to after steering. Bleeding did stop and the
Commanding Officer once again was, well, this time he was
placed in his chair on the port wing. He gave orders there
for quite awhile. It was also a matter of identification.
We, ourselves, were asking the question, "Who made the
attacks?", "And why?". There was a time when I was in the
pilot house that I heard the Commanding Officer holler to
someone, perhaps signalman DAVID, to get the Ensign, the
colors, off the deck. I went out to the starboard wing, and
there was an Ensign on the deck. I went out a little bit
further and looked up and we were flying our Ensign. I
found that later all of the starboard halyards or hoists
had been shot down and that signalman DAVID had run up
another Ensign.
[18]
Things quieted down somewhat at this time. We still had no
indication if we were still under attack or not. I know
that there were several times later in the afternoon and
early evening that we did take cover at the order of the
Commanding Officer when some aircraft did approach at a
distance. We were still doing the best we could to head due
North. We still had considerable deviation from the base
course. I can't recall what speed we finally did attain.
I think we tried to make turns for 8 knots, and found it too
difficult at that speed to hold the course, and dropped back
to all ahead 1/3. We had main control make turns for five
knots. There were several times when we were almost dead in
the water. Believe that just before or just after the
torpedo attack we had no turns. Another time that I can
recall that lube oil suction was lost. Both boilers were
on the line. We had to wait until that situation was
corrected. Seems as if there were several other occasions
when it was not possible to get power. After the attack
from the patrol boats had stopped, and before we had
steadied up, or successfully steadied up on an approximate
course of 000, I was checking the fathometer, which was the
only piece of equipment on the bridge that I know was
functioning and it was only functioning on the 100 fathom
scale at the time. Our readings started decreasing rapidly.
Commanding Officer ordered me to go to the forecastle, get
some men and to standby to let go an anchor. We proceeded
to the forecastle, had the starboard anchor ready for
letting go, the bridge said "make the port anchor ready".
We were trying to pick up the chain stopper, but the pelican
hook was up almost against the stopper and we could not
raise the stopper. I grabbed a bar of some kind, another
man grabbed a sledge and we were pounding at the stopper to
try to raise it. We received an order from the bridge that
was shouted to us from the Commanding Officer to let go the
port anchor, and we could not let go the port anchor. We
finally pried the stopper up, this was maybe a minute later,
the ship was backing down at that time, all back 1/3. The
readings were increasing, the fathometer readings. We
received an order not to let go the port anchor. After
backing down,
[19]
getting a sufficient depth under the keel, we then come
around to our northerly course again. After we got on our
northerly course, the Commanding Officer came in to his
chair inside the pilothouse and gave all orders to after
steering. Later, this would have been perhaps 1800 or so,
steering was shifted from after steering back to the bridge.
Rear Admiral KIDD: Q. I'd like to interrupt and ask you a
question at this point. Was the Commanding Officer on the
bridge all this time?
A. The Commanding Officer never left the bridge, was there
from the time CQ was sounded. Perhaps he had stayed there
since the drill had secured. He did not leave the bridge
until, I'd say, 0400 the following morning to make a head
call. He made two or three head calls in the course of the
morning, but he did not leave the bridge until the DAVIS was
alongside the following morning at 0700, on the morning
of 10 June. We weren't positive that our magnetic compass
was responding correctly. Every now and then the Commanding
Officer would go out on the wing and would make minor
course adjustments by sighting the North Star. Sometimes
after sunset, a message was delivered to the bridge from
radio central and it stated that the attack had in fact been
made by Israeli forces and that they had extended their
apologies. Prior to this message, we had received word
from the Sixth Fleet that help was on the way. I believe,
initially, they just said, "help". Later on we learned that
two destroyers were coming to rendezvous with us. During
the night, as I said previously, the Commanding Officer left
the bridge only to make a head call and all during the
evening, night, and following morning until the arrival of
the DAVIS, there was an officer with him at all times.
Either LT BENETT, LTJG PAINTER or myself.
Questions by Counsel for the Court:
To your knowledge, was
the Commanding Officer requested to leave the bridge by the
doctor in order to obtain medical attention?
A. I didn't hear the order, it's quite possible, but it
would have taken ten people the doctor's size to even begin
to get him off the bridge.
[20]
Q. How would you describe his reaction to his injuries
A. He was in great pain, there were several times when he
was still walking around, but it was obvious he was in great
pain. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. At
several times felt dizzy. He would not leave, but if he
started to get dizzy, he would turn to me, or if Mr. BENNETT
or Mr. PAINTER were there, he would say this to what course
were on, what speed to make. He would give instructions.
Q. Backtracking to a point during the heat of combat, did
you observe the Captain when he was initially wounded.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And he continued on in this condition without stopping
for assistance by medical?
A. That is correct. It was quite awhile before he did slow
down enough to have the belt tourniquet put on the leg. I
assisted with that. I used my belt, and after that a
corpsman came up just long enough to adjust the tourniquet
and take a look at the Commanding Officer. He did not want
any further medical attention and he did not receive any
more until the bleeding started a second time, when I think
the shell fragment was worked loose.
Q. What period of time had elapsed?
A. Over an hour. I can't say for sure, but it had been at
least an hour. How he managed to stay up on the bridge and
keep on his feet, to keep the cool head the way that be did,
is beyond me. He was giving orders to us in the pilothouse,
he was taking photographs of the aircraft, the patrol craft,
attempting to identify them with his binoculars, giving
orders to the gun mounts when they were still manned, was
directing the fire fighting parties, seemed like he was
everywhere at one time. Also giving commands to get the
ship out of the area, away from land as fast as we could.
Questions by Captain ATKINSON:
Q. Mr. LUCAS, approximately
when did you receive word that the Israelis
[21]
had attacked - about how long after the attack?
A. It was right around sunset.
Q. Until that time, you all felt you might be subject to
re-attack?
A. That is correct.
Questions by Counsel for the Court:
Q. At this point I
would like to interrupt your narrative testimony in order to
present this exhibit to the record. I have in my custody as
Counsel for the Court, the quartermasters notebook, USS
LIBERTY. I show you page 102 dated 8 June and ask you if
this is the page you referred to when you testified to
making entries in it?
A. That is the page, starting with the entry at the time
1446, and I continued making entries until 1655.
Q. Let the record also show that page 102 is considerably
splattered with what appears to be blood.
A. It is.
I request the reporter to mark this exhibit number 6. At
this time, the Counsel for the Court offers the
quartermasters logbook into evidence, A true copy thereof
will be substituted in its place.
Q. Will you please read this first entry?
A. "1446, one gunboat tentatively identified as number
206-17." And this was seen by both the Commanding Officer
and myself from the. starboard wing. I mentioned earlier,
the patrol craft was going exactly the opposite direction
that we were. This number was read when it was abeam to
starboard at approximately 500 yards.
Counsel for the Court: It is requested that the Court note
page 138 of Janes Fighting Ships for 1966, which has Israeli
vessels described on that page 138. I will now ask the
witness to identify the patrol craft on page 138, and ask if
it is similar to the one he saw?
A. The patrol craft here, THOMAS, appears to be the exact
same one that I identified. If I had had a camera and taken
a picture of it, I would have gotten the same angle, same
presentation, as is present here in this photograph. There
is one slight difference, there is no dash between the first
three and the last two digits, and what I thought to be 17,
[22]
I found out later from Mr. BENNETT, when I examined this
book, that it was an Israeli symbol that looks like a 17,
but is connected by a horizontal line at the bottom. It's
quite possible that, well I know that, it was difficult to
read the number, not because of the distance, but because of
the bow wake coming over and obscuring the numbers.
Counsel for the Court: I will now ask the court members if
they have any questions on the exhibits that have been
introduced.
Captain ATKINSON:
Q. You say communications were bad. What
communications were you referring to?
A. I don't know much about the communications or research
setup at all.
Q. This is not the bridge communications?
A. That is correct. I believe that was outgoing
communications from the transmitter room.
Q. Were there voice communications passed to the bridge?
A. Not from radio central. We had communications with main
control, damage control central and after steering.
Q. In radio communications do you know where the hicom not
is?
A. We knew nothing of what was going on. All messages,
outgoing and incoming were hand carried up to the bridge
from the radio central personnel. We had been receiving,
monitoring Sixth Fleet communications several days prior to
the attack, but during the attack the only way we could get
hold of somebody was after transmitter room and everything
that was sent out or received came up to the bridge via
handed message.
Q. Do you know specifically what circuits were being
monitored when you said you were monitoring Sixth Fleet
communications before the attack?
[23]
A. I don't know the call signs of the ships involved or
still on the status board in the pilothouse, I can't
recall.
Q. You mentioned that there were fathometer readings
decreasing. Where were you getting this information from?
A. The only fathometer that was working was in CIC, just
aft of the pilothouse, and at that time it was only working
on the 100 fathom scale.
Q. Do you recall the depth?
A. I believe they rapidly approached the middle teens. You
see, we had no radar. This was knocked out, evidently, on
the first air pass. We had to DR from our last fix to give
an approximate 1400B position. We included that position in
the message requiring assistance.
Q. Were you in sight of land at about the time of the pass?
A. Yes we were. After dinner, as is customary on here, we
often go to the 01 level forward on deck chairs to soak up
some sun.
Q. Excuse me, you mean noonday?
A. Noon. There were six officers on the 01 level forward
until turn to at 1300. There was smoke visible from land
off the port side and also during the general quarters
drill. When I was on the 04 level more smoke was visible
and the land itself was barley visible. This was through
the telescope or high powered binoculars on the 04 level.
Q. In the first portion of your testimony, you mention
shelling, what did you intend to convey by the word
"shelling"?
A. The first hit, the first noise that LT GOLDEN and I
heard when we were in the wardroom was obviously a heavy
hit. I assumed this was aircraft and it sounded to us as if
It hit on the starboard side. Like I said, we thought it
was the motor whaleboat falling from its davit onto the
deck. I mentioned shelling again just as soon as I had put
on my battle helmet and life jacket on the bridge. This
again, I would say was aircraft cause there was a whistling
sound several seconds before the actual burst and noise
itself came. After I had gone inside the pilot- house and
was on the deck, there was another series of whistling
sounds preceding the hits. Here again, I assume it was
aircraft. When I had
[24]
come down to the wardroom, was lending a hand to getting the
hose to fight the fire on the port side, there were more
easily discernible whistling sounds, even in the
passageways, that were aircraft hits. The two men who were
handling the hose were keeping an eye out for aircraft.
They would put out the fire until another plane came over
and then they ducked back inside.
Q. Did the motor torpedo boats fire on you with ordnance
other than torpedoes?
A. Yes, they did. This we could easily hear. I can recall
it coming from the starboard side on several occasions. At
the time quartermaster BROWN was on the helm, the fragment
that caught him came from the starboard side and I can't be
sure if it was from the gun boats or from our own shells
baking off. I'm pretty sure it was from the gun boats. And
there were several other occasions of obvious shelling from
the torpedo or motor boats themselves.
Q. Do you have any idea how many aircraft were involved?
A. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. There were
definitely three motor boats.
Q. Are you the Gunnery Officer?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Do the surface lookouts come under your glance at
general quarters?
A. There, at general quarters the lookouts are on the 04
level. The actual lookout training was done by the
Navigator or another member of the Operations Department.
They had received refresher training, this was sometime
since we left Rota on the 2nd of June, and had been
refreshed on reporting all surface contacts to include
relative bearing, approximate range, and target angle. Had
also been given refreshers on reporting aircraft properly,
on elevation, what angle, other factors pertaining to
properly reporting all surface and air contacts to the
officer of the deck. This had been stressed heavily in the
first week in June, before we did reach our operating area.
Q. Was their method of reporting via sound-powered
telephone?
[25]
A. When we were normally steaming at our modified condition
three, the lookouts were on the port and starboard wings, so
it was just a matter of shouting into the officer of the
deck directly. We had stationed, or had one man in each of
the two forward gun mounts. We had ammunition at the guns,
but not actually in the breech. These two men had sound-
powered phones on. We could call them from the bridge
anytime, but for them to call us on the circuit, they would
blow a whistle and we would pick up the phone on the bridge.
I can't recall what circuit it was, but at a toot of a
whistle they could have someone on the bridge alerted to
pick up the phone and talk with them.
Q. During the time that you were on the bridge, did you
receive any lookout reports via sound-powered telephones?
A. During the attack?
Q. During the attack
A. When I got up to the bridge, as I said I did not get to
the 04 level which was my general quarters station. During
general quarters, the two air lookouts were on the 04 level,
but they had not made it up there either. I cannot recall
seeing a surface lookout on either side of the bridge when I
got there. The shelling from the aircraft had either
injured them, or they had taken cover inside the pilothouse.
Q. During, and after the attack, did you have sound-powered
communications with your gun mounts?
A. To the best of my knowledge, we never had contact with
the gun mounts. Let me explain the connection there. My
general quarters station is on the 04 level at gunnery
control. To get an order to the gun mount, it was easier
for the bridge to call a phone talker stationed on the 04
level. He in turn would convey the message to a second
phone talker who had communications will all of the mounts.
No direct communications from the mounts themselves to the
pilothouse, and since no one was able to be on the 04 level,
there was no direct communications. At one time, while the
torpedo boats were firing at us, my man in charge of mount
53, seaman QUINTERO, hollered to me, "should I fire back?",
and I gave him an
[26]
affirmative on that. This was before he and the other men
in mount 53 had been chased away by the fire and flames from
the motor whaleboat. On the forward mounts, I said we had no
communications up there. My third class gunner's mate,
THOMPSON, according to several witnesses, and to the members
of repair two, which is located directly beneath mount 51,
said that petty officer THOMPSON went to mount 51 when GQ
sounded. He was below decks. His station is with me on the
04 level. Guess he figured he didn't have time to get up
there. He went to the closest gun and from the account
given by the people in repair two, it sounded as if he got
off half a box of ammo at the aircraft. They somehow missed
him on the first strafing attack. Several witnesses said
that he had the aircraft under fire while it was circling
for the second pass and it was during the second pass that
he was cut in half by a rocket, but he had the aircraft
under fire and got off at least half a box of 50 caliber
ammo.
Q. Do you recall how long the Ensign was down?
A. I cannot recall for sure. From the first air attack,
the radar was made inoperative, the antenna on the mainmast
was damaged, obviously on the first air pass and the Ensign
would be flying just below it and just aft of it.
Evidently, the shelling that got the radarscope, well it
could have very possibly severed the halyard lines at that
time. I do not recall when the Commanding Officer saw the
Ensign on the deck and told someone to pick it up, but I do
recall going out on the starboard wing, looking up and
seeing that there was an Ensign flying.
Q. Do you remember the time frame when you looked and saw
the Ensign flying, was it during the surface or the air
attack?
A. I can't set an exact time on it. I do believe that I
recall that at this time the patrol craft was off our
starboard side at an approximate bearing of 120. It seems
to me that this might have been around the time when I
investigated the firing coming from mount 53 and found it
was bullets cooking off as opposed to men being there
actually firing.
[27]
Q. Did you look and see the Ensign flying before the
torpedo hit, or was it after?
A. I cannot honestly recall whether it was before or after.
Q. When did you receive your injuries?
A. As soon as I had gotten to the bridge and put on the
battle helmet, I mentioned what I assumed were rockets from
the aircraft hit in the immediate vicinity. I hit the deck
and picked up several pieces of [deleted] One of them was
bleeding enough that I took out my handkerchief and wrapped
it around [deleted]. The piece of fragment that hit me in
the [deleted] occurred much later, after I had been to the
wardroom, returned to the bridge, and after the
quartermaster had been killed on the helm. The commanding
Officer came from the port wing into the pilothouse, and he
said "standby for another attack". I don't recall if it
was surface, air, or torpedo. He said "take cover". I
heard some firing, some ricocheting off the starboard side.
I assumed it was from the patrol craft. I was in the rear
portion of the pilothouse and tried to crawl behind the
water fountain as best I could, and I got most of me back
when I felt something hit me just to the right of
[deleted] it started bleeding rapidly. I tore off the
[deleted] over the wound and just continued on from there.
Q. When did you receive treatment for your wounds?
A. I didn't know that I had any metal in me as such,
[deleted] I
had no pain. I would guess the first time that I was
looked at was on the 10th of June. I went back to
sickbay. The night before I had a little bit of
swelling, so went back to have the doctor have a look at
it. This was just the injury. He took an xray and did
find that there was a chunk of metal in there. I believe
he said it was [deleted]
Q. Do you recall that the patrol boats strafed the ship
after the torpedo attack, and if so, how many times?
A. Sir, I cannot honestly answer that.
[28]
Q. Let me put the question a little bit differently -
earlier in your statement you observed that the patrol boats
were attempting to communicate with flashing light?
A. This was definitely after the torpedo attack.
Q. The flashing lights from the boats were after the
torpedo attack?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. I also understood from you that the ship was unable to
respond to the flashing lights from the boats?
A. To the first signaling, that is affirmative, because the
smoke that was between the patrol craft and us.
Q. And I believe, also, the starboard wing 24-inch
searchlight had been shot away earlier in the action. Is
that not correct?
A. The only signaling light we had available was a small
portable light, the face of which was approximately six
inches in diameter.
Q. I believe that is called an Altis Lamp and the intensity
of that light, from personal knowledge, would probably be
completely inadequate to penetrate the smoke?
A. Yes sir. All power to all of the other lights was off.
Even if it had been on, there was only one operative light
on either the 03 or 04 level. The only one that had not
been hit.
Q. To the best of your recollection, after the motor
torpedo boats signaled, were there any further attacks from
them?
A. No, there were not. After this first signaling, I
don't believe so. After they signaled "do you need help?",
and we answered in the negative, I am positive there were no
more attacks after that time.
Q. With regard to the signal from the torpedo boats, when
did you first observe the signaling, with respect to the
torpedo attack?
A. The first signaling that I observed was the unsuccessful
attempts to determine what they were signaling us, and of
course, we did not have a chance to answer back to them.
This was after the torpedo attacks. The only other signaling
that I recall seeing is when we did successfully receive
their message and sent a negative answer to it
[29]
Q. Mr. LUCAS, did you bring with you any examples of
ordnance or shrapnel recovered aboard USS LIBERTY subsequent
to the attack?
A. With the exception of one fragment that was located this
morning, the remainder of these fragments and shells were
brought up to the pilothouse in the course of the evening
and the following morning after the attack. These were
turned in by various personnel throughout the ship. Several
of these have been turned in since the night of the 8th and
the morning of the 9th.
Counsel for the Court: At this time it to requested that
these examples be marked exhibit 7, that they be introduced
into evidence and copies of photographs be made for record
purposes.
President: Let the record also show that these fragments are
but a cross- sectional sample of the type of bullets and
shrapnel which "holed" the ship.
President:.
Q. A question if you please - would you be kind
enough to expand on the performance of duty of a young man
mentioned earlier in your testimony, named LARKINS?
A. Seaman LARKINS helps man mount 54, 03 level, port side,
as his general quarters station. He was on that mount, and
stayed on that mount, until the fire coming from the 01
level chased him away. He did recall seeing a plane
approaching from the port side and lobbing a cylinder that
was attached under the wing. A cylinder five to six feet
long, approximately ten inches in diameter. This cylinder
approached the 01 level port side in an end over end
fashion. After it hit, and the fire started, he climbed
over the skylight to mount 53 and helped the gun crew there
until the fire from the motor whaleboat drove all people
away from that mount. I later personally saw him helping to
extinguish the fire on the port side and still later, he, by
himself, manned mount 51 and fired one shot before he
received a cease fire from the Commanding Officer.
President: No further questions - before you leave to go to
the hospital, the Court would like to express itself with a
feeling of great pride to
[30]
be associated with the service's uniform you wear, young
man, and we thank you very much for your cooperation and
fine testimony.
Mr. LUCAS: Thank you, Admiral.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The Court recessed at 1045 hours, 14 June 1967 from taking
further testimony in order to examine exhibits received by
the Board.the Board.
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